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Abstract
This paper adopts an evolutionary perspective on the rent-extraction model with con-
jectural variations (CV) allowing for mixed-strategies. We analyze the dynamics of the
model with n CVs under the replicator equation. We find that the end points of the
evolutionary dynamics include the pure-strategy consistent CVs. However, there are also
mixed-strategy equilibria that occur: these are on the boundaries between the basins of
attraction of the pure-strategy sinks. Further, we develop a more general notion of con-
sistency which applies to mixed-strategy equilibria. In a three conjecture example, by
conducting a global dynamics analysis, we prove that in contrast to the pure-strategy
equilibria, the mixed-strategy equilibria are not ESS: under the replicator dynamics, there
are three or four mixed equilibria that may either be totally unstable (both eigenvalues
positive), or saddle-stable (one stable eigenvalue). There also exist heteroclinic orbits that
link equilibria together. Whilst only the pure-strategies can be fully consistent, we find a
lower bound for the probability that mixed strategy conjectures will be ex post consistent.
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1 Introduction.
In this paper, we adopt a dynamic approach to analyze the evolution of beliefs underlying
agents’ behavior in the context of a rent-extraction game a` la Tullock (1980). The idea is that
the boundedly-rational agents employ decision rules, such as reaction functions, based on certain
beliefs about other players’ behavior. But how are these beliefs formed? Recently, some authors
have adopted an evolutionary approach to explaining such beliefs using Maynard-Smith’s notion
of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS)1. The idea is that the belief can be treated as a meme,
and that beliefs that result in higher profits become more common. ESS is however a local
stability condition: it considers the effects on payoffs of a small deviation in the make-up of the
population. In this paper we broaden the focus to consider the global dynamics of an explicit
evolutionary process - the replicator equation. We apply this dynamic evolutionary approach
to explain belief formation in the context of a rent-seeking game (Tullock (1967, 1980, 1987),
Posner (1975)) where agents spend resources to dispute over rents or some prizes. Agents’ beliefs
about other players’ behavior are particularly important in such models as it can directly impact
the magnitude of the rent extracted by altering the success function. Importantly, rent-seeking
models have many applications in economics and politics e.g. in elections where resources
allocated to campaigning directly affect the candidate’s probability of success and where the
allocation itself is done based on the agent’s belief about his opponent’s behavior. Menezes and
Quiggin (2010) have provided several different interpretations of such rent-extraction models
and have argued that they should be viewed as oligopsonistic markets for influence.
A decision rule in this context can be thought of as a reaction function (RF) which specifies
the choice of action as a function of other agents’ actions. Whilst there are various ways of
parametrizing such decision rules, the one we adopt in this paper is the concept of Conjectural
Variations. The notion of conjectures has maintained a long history in the Industrial Organi-
zation theory ever since the introduction of Conjectural Variations Equilibria by Bowley (1924)
and Frisch (1951 [1933])2. Not only are conjectural variations (henceforth CV) models able to
capture a range of behavioral outcomes - from competitive to cooperative, but also they have
one parameter which has a simple economic interpretation. CV models have also been found
quite useful in the empirical analysis of firm behavior in the sense that they provide a more
general description of firms’ behavior than the standard Nash equilibrium (Slade (1995)). The
concept of CVs has also been seen as useful in anti-trust policy3.
1See, e.g. Dixon and Somma (2003), Mu¨ller and Normann (2005), Possajennikov (2009). See Jean-Marie
and Tidball (2006) for a non-evolutionary approach to formation of conjectures in a dynamic context.
2See Giocoli (2005) for a detailed account of the role of conjectural variations in the history of oligopoly
games. Frisch paramterized the CV in terms of an elasticity rather than a derivative. Hicks (1935) survey is
probably responsible for making the concept of CVs well known.
3See for example the recent Office of Fair Trading (2011) report.
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In this context, the concept of consistent conjectures was developed by a number of authors
in the 1980s (see Bresnahan (1981), Boyer and Moreaux (1983), Klemperer and Meyer (1988))
and has been widely applied ever since in a variety of circumstances such as public goods (Cornes
and Sandler (1984)4, Itaya and Okamura (2003), strategic investment models (Dixon (1986)),
export subsidies (Tanaka (1991)), natural resource extraction (Que´rou and Tidball (2009)). In
Public Economics, Michaels (1989) applied this concept in the context of Tullock’s rent-seeking
game to show that the fraction of rents dissipated by seekers depends upon the type of CV
assumed. In games with quadratic payoffs where the best-response functions with CVs are
linear, the natural formulation for consistent conjectures is that the CV of one player equals the
actual slope of the other player’s RF. However, in games where the payoffs are not quadratic
and therefore the RFs are non-linear (such as the ones in rent-seeking models with CVs), the
notion of consistency can accordingly be adapted: consistency should imply that CVs are equal
to the slopes of RFs at the equilibrium point.
Recently, the link between consistency and evolutionary stability has been made within the
CV framework. One can think of economic agents’ behavior being summarized by the CV term.
One can imagine a population consisting of firms with different CVs which will earn different
payoffs (on average) and a process of ”natural selection” or social learning takes place (the CV
is a meme). Firms with particular CVs do better than those with others: a process of imitation
or adaption leads agents to switch from less successful CVs to more successful CVs. Dixon and
Somma (2003) established that in a standard oligopoly setting with a quadratic payoff function5,
the consistent conjectures are the unique Nash equilibrium in a hypothetical ”conjecture game”:
firms choose their CVs given the CVs of the other firms so as to maximize their payoffs in the
output game. This Nash equilibrium in the conjecture game was the consistent conjecture.
This enabled the link to be made with evolutionary stable strategies (ESS). In the case where
there is a strict-Nash equilibrium in the conjecture game, the resultant consistent conjecture
will be ESS. Mu¨ller and Normann (2005) generalized this result to a wider class of oligopoly
models6. Both Dixon and Somma (2003) and Mu¨ller and Normann (2005) were in the class of
quadratic payoff models. Possajennikov (2009) showed that the link between ESS models and
consistent conjectures extends to some non-quadratic payoff models, including the rent-seeking
model (such as the one considered by Michaels (1989)).
However, all of the above studies were limited in that they focussed exclusively on pure-
strategy equilibria and that they only studied local stability using the ESS condition. In contrast,
the main contribution of this paper is to extend the focus to analyze the global evolutionary
4See also Cornes and Sandler (1985) and Sugden (1985).
5Specifically, they consider a homogeneous good Cournot oligopoly with linear demand and quadratic costs.
6Specifically, differentiated oligopoly with linear demands.
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dynamics in the context of mixed-strategies. We do indeed find that in addition to the pure-
strategy equilibria, mixed-strategy equilibria will exist in a finite version of the conjecture game
where we restrict the set of permissible CVs to a finite set of n distinct conjectures. We provide
a bifurcation analysis and show that in addition to the pure-strategy equilibria, there will in
general exist many mixed-strategy equilibria.
Further, we define a new concept of consistency that is applicable to the case of mixed-
strategy equilibria. This is the notion of the probability that the conjectures will be consistent
ex post. In the case of a pure-strategy equilibrium, the standard consistent conjectures are
100% consistent ex post. With mixed strategy equilibria, the conjectures will only be consistent
a certain proportion of the time. Hence, whilst the link between consistency and equilibrium in
the conjecture game still exists, it is weaker in the case of mixed-strategies than for pure-strategy
equilibria.
Our main results about the dynamics are as follows. We are first able to determine some
results which hold for the case where there are n conjectures. All n pure-strategy equilibria
(except the Bertrand) are sinks (Proposition 2). We were also able to characterize the properties
of mixed stationary points involving just two or three of the n strategies: some of these stationary
points will be mixed Nash equilibria, which will have an n−1 dimensional stable manifold; others
will not be Nash equilibria and will have stable manifolds with a lower dimension than n − 1
(Propositions 3 and 4).
We are able to determine fully the dynamics in the n = 3 conjecture case which can be
depicted on the two dimensional simplex. Proposition 5 and 6 summarize the local dynamics:
the pure strategy-equilibria are sinks (the eigenvalues of the Jacobian are all negative), whilst
the strictly-mixed stationary points can either be saddle-path stable (one negative and one
positive eigenvalue) or unstable sources (all eigenvalues are positive). For the global dynamics,
in Proposition 7 we find that there is a network of heteroclinic orbits7 that connect equilibria.
The heteroclinic orbits connecting these mixed-strategy stationary points with each other and
the pure-strategy sinks constitute the boundaries of the basins of attraction for the pure-strategy
sinks. There are two generic phase diagrams which describe the exact pattern of equilibria: in
particular, if the most competitive conjecture is competitive enough we can have an internal
mixed-equilibrium (with all three conjectures with strictly positive shares) which is a source.
Otherwise, we have the more general case where there are three stationary points involving
only two conjectures with strictly positive probabilities: two of these stationary points are Nash
equilibria (and saddle-path stable) with the third being a non-Nash equilibrium unstable source.
We can use the global dynamics as a guide to equilibrium selection. The most cooperative
7An heterclinic orbit is an equilibrium path that connects two (or more) stationary points. This contrasts
to homoclinic orbits which have only one stationary point at both end-points.
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pure-strategy equilibrium is Pareto-dominant (from the point of view of the rent seekers) and
involves the least rent dissipation and highest payoff. However, we do not find that in general
the most cooperative conjecture has the biggest basin. Indeed, in the three conjecture case we
might expect the intermediate conjecture to have the bigger basin. The reason is that in the
rent-extraction model, the intermediate CV can do quite well against the two extremes, whilst
the two extremes do badly against each other. Moderation can pay. This means that the
intermediate conjecture can end up with a share of 1 even if it starts from a share of almost zero.
In contrast, the two extreme conjectures require an initial base which is bounded well away from
zero if they are to be selected. Whilst we cannot in general rank the most cooperative and the
intermediate conjecture, we can in general say that the most competitive equilibrium will have
a smaller basin than the most cooperative. Indeed, in the extreme case of a ”Bertrand” CV of
−1, the basin of attraction shrinks to zero.
The notion of evolutionary dynamics (such as the replicator) is not unproblematic: if one
takes a literal view of the equations, they are based on random matching with the game played
repeatedly in continuous time. However, one can think of this more as an evolutionary metaphor :
over time, more successful strategies become more common. There are a variety of ways this
can happen in social learning models. However, to explore the dynamics without recourse to
simulating simple models we need to use a specific evolutionary process: the replicator equation
is a robust framework that can stand for a wider class of payoff-monotone dynamics.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we outline the basic rent-seeking
model, which can also be thought of as a Cournot Oligopoly game, where we treat the conjectures
as given. In section 3, we consider the underlying conjecture game and pure-strategy equilibria
in the case where the strategy sets are a closed convex subset of the real line, and mixed-strategy
equilibria where the strategy sets are a finite subset of the pure-strategy case. In section 4, we
consider the relation between consistency and the equilibria in the conjecture game. In section
5, we analyze the evolutionary process of the model using the replicator equation. Section 6
concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 The model.
We consider the following game where two firms X and Y choose actions (x, y) independently
with payoff functions given as follows:
UX(x, y) =
x
x+ y
− x
UY (x, y) =
y
x+ y
− y
4
This can be thought of as a simple rent-seeking game a` la Tullock (1980) where players
choose actions (e.g. effort or investment) to win a prize of fixed value (which is unity in the
above formulation), where the first term in the payoff function denotes the probability of player
i’s winning the contest, i = X, Y , and the second term denotes constant unit cost of the action.
Alternatively, this game can also be thought of as a homogeneous good Cournot duopoly8 with
unit elastic demand and constant unit cost where the market price is given by
P =
1
x+ y
so that total revenue equals 1, each firm receives a share of that revenue equal to its share of
output9, and the total cost of player i equals player i’s output. For economically meaningful
outcomes, we can restrict our attention to the strategy-space:
S = {(x, y) : x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0 and x+ y ≤ 1}
The above payoff-function is strictly concave for (x, y) ∈ S ∩ (0, 1)2. The corresponding iso-
payoff sets for X are characterized by
U¯X = {(x, y) : UX(x, y) = U¯}
and have slopes given by
dy
dx
∣∣∣∣
U¯x
=
y − x2 − 2xy − y2
x
For U¯ ∈ (0, 1), the iso-payoff curve intersects the x− axis at (1− U¯ , 0) . However, all iso-
payoff sets with U¯ ∈ (0, 1) originate from (0, 0). The payoff function is undefined for x = y = 0.
However, in order to convert the joint profit supremum into a maximum, we adopt the definition
UX(0, 0) = UY (0, 0) = 0.5. In the event of neither player doing anything, the prize is split.
2.1 Conjectural variation (CV) output game.
Each firm has a conjecture about the response of the other firm to variations in its own output.
φx = ∂y/∂x and φy = ∂x/∂y denote such conjectures held by firms X and Y respectively
where φi ∈ [−1,+1], i = x, y. This gives the reaction functions (RFs) defined by the following
8It has been shown that a standard Tullock contest of the above type is strategically equivalent to a Cournot
oligopoly game, and that the same strategic equivalence applies also with a more general success function in the
original Tullock game (see Okuguchi (1995), Szidarovsky and Okuguchi (1997).
9Henceforth, we will refer to x and y as ‘outputs’.
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first-order conditions:
1
(x+ y)
− x
(x+ y)2
(1 + φx)− 1 = 0
1
(x+ y)
− y
(x+ y)2
(1 + φy)− 1 = 0
From above, we get the reaction functions in the following form:
x = R(y, φx) = −1
2
φx − y + 1
2
+
√
φ2x + 4φxy + 4y (1)
y = R(x, φy) = −1
2
φy − x+ 1
2
+
√
φ2y + 4φyx+ 4x (2)
For {(φx, φy) ∈ [−1, 1]2 and 1− φyφx > 0} , the equilibrium values of output are given by:
x (φx, φy) =
(1 + φy)(1− φyφx)
(2 + φy + φx)2
(3)
y (φx, φy) =
(1 + φx)(1− φyφx)
(2 + φy + φx)
2 (4)
In the cases where φyφx = 1, we set x(1, 1) = 0 and x(−1,−1) = 12 and likewise for y,
these being the limiting values10. In case of symmetric conjectures (φx = φy = φ), equilibrium
outputs will be given by
x(φ, φ) = y(φ, φ) =
1− φ
4
(5)
We can consider the following special cases:
(i) Cournot-Nash conjectures: φx = φy = 0
(1) and (2) then yield
x = −y +√y
y = −x+√x
so that Cournot-Equilibrium values are
xc = yc =
1
4
and
UX = UY = U |Cournot = 1
4
10Alternatively, one can restrict the strategy set to [−1 + ε, 1− ε] for some arbitrarily small ε > 0.
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(ii) Bertrand-Nash conjectures: φx = φy = −1
(1) and (2) then yield
x = 1− y
y = 1− x
which has the set of solutions x + y = 1, with the symmetric solution being at x = y = 1
2
with
corresponding equilibrium payoffs U |Bertrand = 0.
(iii) Fully collusive conjectures: φx = φy = 1
In this case, (3) and (4) imply x = y = 0.This is the joint profit maximum.
3 The Conjecture Game.
In order to analyze the evolutionary properties of conjectures, following Dixon and Somma
(2003), we consider a further stage of the game where firms are choosing their conjectures.11
We will first analyze this hypothetical ”conjecture game” in terms of pure-strategies, where the
strategy sets are intervals on the real line. We will then consider the case of finite strategy
sets in order to analyze the possible existence of mixed-strategy equilibria where more than one
strategy is played with a positive probability.
3.1 Pure-strategy equilibria.
Given the equilibrium outputs as a function of the conjectures, we can think of a reduced form
game of the equilibrium given conjectures with each firm choosing its conjecture. For ease of
notation and for the purpose of analysing the dynamics (see section 5), we will reparameterize
the conjectures as ϕi = (1 + φi) for i = x, y where ϕi ∈ [0, 2]. With this re-parameterisation
then ϕi = 1 implies Cournot-Nash conjectures; ϕi = 0 implies Bertrand-Nash conjectures; and
ϕi = 2 implies fully collusive conjeectures. The outputs and payoffs for the conjecture game,
after simplification, are respectively:
11The entire game can equivalently be considered ”as if” a two stage game where firms choose their conjectures
in the first stage, and then given their choice of conjectures in the first stage, they choose outputs in the second
stage.
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x (ϕx, ϕy) =
(ϕy)(ϕx + ϕy − ϕyϕx)
(ϕy + ϕx)2
(6)
y (ϕx, ϕy) =
(ϕx)(ϕx + ϕy − ϕyϕx)
(ϕy + ϕx)2
(7)
and
UX(ϕx, ϕy) =
ϕxϕ
2
y
(ϕy + ϕx)2
(8)
UY (ϕx, ϕy) =
ϕyϕ
2
x
(ϕy + ϕx)2
(9)
Firms’ equilibrium choice of conjectures will then be obtained from the following first-order
conditions for X (and conversely for Y ):
dUX(ϕx, ϕy)
dϕx
=
ϕ2y
(ϕy + ϕx)3
(ϕy − ϕx) = 0 (10)
This yields the following reaction functions in the conjecture game for X:
RX(ϕy) = ϕy
That is, the best-response of firm is to choose the same conjecture as the other firm12. Thus,
we have the following proposition (stated without proof):
Proposition 1. Pure strategy Nash equilibrium conjectures are symmetric.
Thus, there is a continuum of ”strict” Nash equilibria, each parameterized by the symmetric
conjecture ϕ ∈ [0, 2] with equilibrium output levels given by
x(ϕ, ϕ) = y(ϕ, ϕ) =
2− ϕ
4
(11)
and symmetric payoffs given by:
U(ϕ) =
ϕ
4
(12)
There is also a ”Bertrand” Nash equilibrium which is not strict: if one firm sets ϕ = 0, then
the other firm earns zero profits whatever conjecture it has. Clearly, the equilibria are Pareto-
ranked: the higher the conjecture, the higher the profits, with the limiting profit being half
the joint profit maximum U(2) = 1
2
and the minimum being the Bertrand case U(0) = 0. The
12The second order conditions are clearly satisfied from (10).
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structure of the conjecture game is similar to a coordination game, except that the ”off-diagonal”
elements vary with the conjectures.
3.2 Mixed-strategy Equilibria.
Mixed-strategy equilibria will also exist if we take a finite subset of conjectures. In this sec-
tion, we provide an example, prior to a more general analysis when we model the evolutionary
dynamics in section 5.
Consider a finite subset of conjectures ϕ taken from [0, 2], with #ϕ = n, and index set
S1 = {1, 2, . . . , n} so that ϕ = {ϕi}i∈S1 . This then gives us an n× n payoff matrix A :
A
n×n
=
[
piij = U
I(ϕi, ϕj)
]
ij∈S1×S1 , I = X, Y. (13)
where the row i gives the payoff to the firm playing each strategy i (conjecture) against j and
the column j gives us the payoff of playing strategy j against each of the strategies i. Note
that since the game is payoff-symmetric, we can use either firm’s payoff function to define the
payoff matrix.
Let z = (z1, . . . , zn) ∈ ∆n−1, where zi is the probability that conjecture i will be played.
Then, the expected payoff of strategy i is
ui(z) = (Az)i =
∑
j∈S1
piijzj, i ∈ S1, (14)
and the n-vector of expected payoffs for all strategies u is
u(z) = Az. (15)
If we consider the 3× 3 payoff matrix generated by conjectures Φ = {1, 1.5, 2}, we have:
A =
 0.25 0.36 0.44440.24 0.375 0.4898
0.2222 0.3673 0.5
 (16)
In addition to the 3 pure strategy equilibria, there are also 2 mixed equilibria. Adapting the
notation slightly, so that z(ϕ) is the probability that conjecture ϕ is played, the 2 mixed equilibria
are given by:
• z∗(2) = 0.4302, z∗(3
2
) = 1− z∗(2), z∗ (1) = 0.
• z∗(2) = 0, z∗(3
2
) = 0.4, z∗ (1) = 0.6.
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There is the following profile in which z∗(3
2
) = 0, and the two conjectures (2, 1) earn equal
payoffs:
z∗(2) =
1
3
, z
(
3
2
)
= 0, z∗(1) =
2
3
This is not an equilibrium, because the expected payoff from playing 1.5 exceeds the payoffs of the
other two. Note that in this example, both mixed-equilibria involve only pairs of strategies being
played with strictly positive probabilities, there being no equilibrium with all three strategies
being played. As we show below, this is not a general property: strictly interior solutions in
which all three probabilities are strictly positive may also exist.
4 Consistency of conjectures.
There are several definitions of consistency of conjectures available13. However, we use the
one in the sense of Bresnahan (1981), that in the output game each firm’s conjecture about
the slope of the other firm’s reaction function is correct at the equilibrium outputs. Unlike the
quadratic payoff framework considered by Dixon and Somma (2003) and Mu¨ller and Normann
(2005), the CV reaction functions are not linear in this model, so that consistency-correctness
at equilibrium outputs does not imply correctness elsewhere. This has important implications
for the evolutionary stability of equilibria as we shall see.
From (1), the slopes of the reaction functions written in terms of ϕi are:
dR(y, ϕx)
dy
= −1 + ϕx√
(ϕx − 1)2 + 4ϕxy
(17)
dR(x, ϕy)
dx
= −1 + ϕy√
(ϕy − 1)2 + 4ϕyy
(18)
Now, we can set the outputs (x, y) at their equilibrium values given (ϕx, ϕy) using (6), (7) ,
and then consider whether or not the conjectures are consistent.
13See, e.g. Hahn (1977, 1978); Perry (1982); Kamien and Schwartz (1983); Boyer and Moreaux (1983).
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4.1 Pure-strategy Equilibria and consistency.
From Proposition 1, we can focus attention only on the symmetric conjectures: ϕy = ϕx = ϕ.
Equations (17) and (18) then simplify as:
dR(y, ϕ)
dy
=
dR(x, ϕ)
dx
= −1 + ϕ√
(ϕ− 1)2 + 4ϕy
(19)
Evaluating the above slopes at the equilibrium values of output given by (11) and simplifying,
we find:
dR(y, ϕ)
dy
=
dR(x, ϕ)
dx
= ϕ− 1 = φ (20)
Hence, all pure-strategy (symmetric) Nash equilibrium conjectures are consistent.14 This is
true for any ϕ ∈ [0, 2] so that:
Observation 1 The set of consistent conjectures equilibria is equivalent to the set of pure-
strategy Nash equilibria in the conjecture game.
Further, we also observe that,
Observation 2 Unlike Bresnahan (1981), Cournot conjectures are consistent in this model.
To see that, note for ϕx = 1 (φx = 0), the slope of firm X’s RF from (19) is:
dR(y, 1)
dy
= −1 + 1
2
√
y
which when evaluated at Cournot output level y = 1/4, yields dR(y,1)
dy
= 0. Likewise for ϕy = 1.
However, if the conjectures are asymmetric i.e. ϕx 6= ϕy (as is the case in mixed-strategy)
then that will involve inconsistent conjectures (in the above sense) by one or both of the firms.
4.2 Mixed-strategy equilibria and consistency.
The existing definition of consistency has been developed purely for the pure-strategy case. Is
there any sense in which a mixed-strategy equilibrium in the conjecture game can consistent?
14A similar result is also be found in Michaels (1989) who showed that there can be multiple equilibria in the
standard symmetric form of the game where any CV can be consistent. Michaels however does not consider a
conjecture stage of the game as we do in this paper.
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In this paper, we develop the notion of ex post consistency15
Definition. Ex post consistency PC. In equilibrium, there is a probability that both players
will choose the same conjecture.
If both players choose the same conjecture, their conjectures are ”consistent” in the resultant
game ex post. If they choose different conjectures, they will not be consistent. Hence, we can
define the probability of ex post consistency:
PC(z∗) =
n∑
i=1
(z∗i )
2
For example, in the two mixed Nash equilibria identified in the 3× 3 example, we have:
PC(0.4302, 0.5698, 0) = (0.430 2)2 + ( 0.569 8)2 = 0.509 8
PC(0.6, 0.4, 0) = 0.36 + 0.16 = 0.52
In the case of pure-strategy equilibria, of course PC(1) = 1: the conjecture is correct in
equilibrium. However, when we have strictly mixed-strategies, the conjectures will only be
correct a certain proportion of the time: in the three mixed equilibria in our game they are
correct 51− 52% of the time.
In general the isoquants for PC are simply concentric circles measuring the distance from
the center of the simplex: the minimum is
min
z∈∆N−1
PC(z) =
1
N
,
which occurs the center point and the maximum is PC = 1 which occurs at the vertices (pure
strategies).
This can be seen in the three dimensional case as depicted in Figure 1. The unit circle
touches the three vertices and represents PC = 1. The equilibria on the edges satisfy16:
PC ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
The PC = 1/2 circle touches the three edges at their midpoint: PC is increasing along the edges
in both directions. In the three conjecture case the minimum of PC = 1/3.
15In an earlier version of the paper, we also proposed a possible ex ante definition, that the average conjecture
equaled the expected slope. This is a more distant concept from the original consistency condition and therefore
we do not pursue it here.
16We can see that the two mixed equilibria in our example both lie in this range.
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Insert figure 1 here
Hence in a mixed-strategy equilibrium there is a probability of consistency ex post which is
captured by PC. The interesting question is the link between stability (local and global) and
the probability of consistency. It is to this that we next turn.
5 Evolutionary Dynamics.
In this section, we analyze the dynamics of the model using the replicator equation. Previous
authors have focussed only on the local stability of consistent conjectures using Maynard Smith’s
notion of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). Analyzing global dynamics is important as it
will enable us to understand how the ”population” behaves from any given starting point, rather
than assuming a small deviation from a proposed equilibrium. Furthermore, this is particularly
important in our context because of the large number of equilibria and the possibility of the
dynamics providing a criterion for equilibrium selection as we show below. In this section we
derive some results on the number of equilibria for any finite number of strategies, n, and provide
a comprehensive global analysis of the replicator dynamics for the 3 conjecture case (the two
and the four coenjecture cases are described in the appendix).
From (15), the mean payoff across all strategies is:
u¯(z, ϕ) = z>A(ϕ)z =
∑
i∈S1
∑
j∈S1
zizjpiij(ϕ).
Whilst the payoff-matrix A is not symmetric17, the following transformed symmetry relationships
hold for ϕiϕj 6= 0,
piij
ϕj
=
piji
ϕi
=
ϕiϕj
(ϕi + ϕj)
2 ,
piii
ϕi
=
1
4
.
If ϕ1 = 0 then piij = 0 for i = 1 or j = 1.
We let Φ = {(ϕi)i∈S1 ⊂ [0, 2]
n : 0 ≤ ϕ1 < ϕ2 < ϕi < ϕi+1 < . . . < ϕn ≤ 2} be the set of
possible ordered strategies and assume, without loss of generality, that ϕ ∈ Φ.
The replicator dynamics (henceforth RD) is given by the n-dimensional ordinary differential
equation system 18
z˙i = Fi(z, ϕ) ≡ zi (ui(z, ϕ)− u¯(z, ϕ)) , i ∈ S1 (21)
where z ∈ ∆n−1, i.e., such that ∑i∈S1 zi = 1 and 0 ≤ zi ≤ 1, for all i ∈ S1.
17The asymmetry of A arises because when ϕi 6= ϕj , piij 6= piji. as in our previous 3 conjecture example (16)
18See Hofbauer and Sigmund (2003) and Sandholm (2010) for recent accounts of the properties of this type of
evolutionary dynamics.
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Let us denote by Sk the set of all combination of the indices of k strategy profiles where each
index is drawn from S1. The number of combinations without repetition of k strategies drawn
from the set of n strategies is
C(n, k) =
n!
k!(n− k)! , k = 1, . . . , n.
Then the set of pure strategies has the index set S1 with cardinality C(n, 1) = n, the set of
combinations of two strategies has the index set S2 = { ij : i, j ∈ S1, j > i} with cardinality
C(n, 2); the set of combinations of three strategies has the index set S3 = { ijk : i, j, k ∈ S1, k >
j > i} with cardinality C(n, 3), and so on. Set Sn has only one element.
We introduce the following notation for the elements of simplex ∆n−1. First, we denote
the boundary by ∂(∆n−1) and the interior by int(∆n−1). In the boundary of the simplex we
distinguish further the elements of the boundary which are vertices ei = { z ∈ ∂∆n−1 : zi = 1}
for i ∈ S1, one-dimensional hyperplanes joining two vertices i and j, eij = { z ∈ ∂∆n−1 :
zi + zj = 1}, for ij ∈ S2, two-dimensional hyperplanes joining three vertices i, j and l, eijk =
{ z ∈ ∂∆n−1 : zi + zj + zk = 1}, for ijk ∈ S3, and so on.
Whilst a Nash-equilibrium is a stationary distribution for the RD equation (21), not all
stationary distributions are Nash equilibria. A necessary condition for a stationary distribution
is that it should be a fixed points for equation (21). The set of all possible fixed points for
the RD is Z = { z ∈ Rn : F(z) = 0}. The set of fixed-points Z within the simplex ∆n−1
is Z∗ = { z ∈ ∆n−1 : F(z) = 0}. A stationary distribution z∗ ∈ Z∗, is Nash equilibrium if
the condition u(z∗) ≤ u¯(z∗) holds: Z∗Nash = {z ∈ ∆n−1 : F(z) = 0, u(z) ≤ u¯(z)}. Hence
Z∗ ⊆ Z∗ ⊆ Z∗Nash. The difference between Z∗ and Z∗Nash arises because of the ”no return”
feature of the RD: once a conjecture is extinct (zi = 0), it can never come back. Hence there
are stationary points for which all of the active conjectures earn equal profits, but for which the
”extinct” conjectures would earn above average profits were they to ”return” and have a strictly
positive share. Clearly, stationary points which are not Nash equilibria will be fragile: they are
stationary only because the replicator dynamics we analyze are deterministic.
5.1 The model with n distinct conjectures.
This subsection gathers some results for the n-dimensional case. Although the dynamics gener-
ated by equation (21) cannot be completely characterized, we can derive some general results.
We then illustrate how this works in the case of three conjectures n = 3 (the 2 and 4 conjecture
cases are analyzed in the appendix).
The maximum number of stationary points for equation (21), F(z, ϕ) = 0, for ϕ ∈ Φ, ruling
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out the trivial case z = 0, is
n∑
k=1
C(n, k) =
n∑
k=1
n!
k!(n− k)! .
This is the cardinality of set Z − {0} and gives an upper bound for the maximum number of
stationary distributions and for the number of Nash equilibria. Each term in the summation
refers to stationary points with only k conjectures having non-zero probabilities zi > 0. There
can only exist at most one stationary point with k = n non-zero probabilities. Clearly there
are possibly a very large number of stationary points. For example, if n = 10 there are up to
252 equilibria with k = 5, 210 each for k = 4 and k = 6, 120 for k = 3 and k = 7, 45 for k = 2
and k = 8, 10 for k = 1 and k = 9, and 1 for k = 10. That is a total of up to 1023 stationary
equilibria, of which 10 are pure strategy profiles and the rest are mixed strategy profiles.
In order to characterize the set Z∗Nash we present and characterize the stationary profiles
which are in the vertices, in the edges joining two vertices, and in the hyperplane joining three
vertices. This allow us to make a conjecture on the existence of stationary mixed strategies in
the interior of the simplex ∆n−1.
First, we consider distributions in the vertices ei for i ∈ S1, corresponding to pure strategy
profiles. If the CV game starts from a mixed strategy sufficiently close to any pure strategy
distribution there will be asymptotic convergence to that pure strategy. The only exception
is the Bertrand conjecture which is a Nash equilibrium, but not ESS. The Bertrand vertex is
unstable and has no sink.
Proposition 2. For any ϕ ∈ Φ there are n pure strategy distribution profiles, z∗ = ei for all
i ∈ S1. If ϕi > 0 ei is a Nash equilibrium and is locally a sink. If ϕ1 = 0 then e1 is a Nash
equilibrium and is a fold bifurcation point.
Second, we consider the mixed strategy stationary equilibria located over the boundary of
the simplex which is formed by the hyperplane (edges) joining any two vertices ei and ej:
e∗ij =
{
zi =
ϕj
ϕi + ϕj
, zj =
ϕi
ϕi + ϕj
, zk = 0, k 6= i, j ∈ S1
}
∈ eij for ij ∈ S2. (22)
For a given pair of strategies ij ∈ S2, define kij = { number of k : i < k < j holds for all k 6=
i, j ∈ S1} and k2 = { number of pairs ij : kij 6= 0, for all ij ∈ S2}. Clearly kij < n and
k2 ≤ C(n, 2).
Proposition 3. Let ϕ ∈ Φ. There are C(n, 2) = n(n− 1)/2 mixed strategy stationary equilibria
in the edges joining two vertices of the simplex ∆n−1, z∗ = e∗ij ∈ eij for all ij ∈ S2. Associated
with ϕ are the corresponding k2 and kij numbers. There is an associated multiplicity of stationary
equilibrium distributions in which there are { n(n− 1)/2− s2} Nash equilibria and s2 non-Nash
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equilibria, for some s2 ∈ {0, . . . , k2}. Nash equilibria are generalized saddle points in which the
local saddle manifold is of dimension n − 1. Stationary profiles which are non Nash equilibria,
have local stable manifolds of dimensions {n− 1− sij}, for some sij ∈ {0, . . . , kij}.
The number of stationary mixed strategies combining two pure strategies, e∗ij, that may not
Nash equilibria is s2 ≤ k2, and have a local unstable manifold with dimension sij + 1 ≤ kij + 1.
We can briefly explain this result.
For a given conjecture profile ϕ ∈ Φ, we define the transformed payoff difference from playing
strategy i against strategy j:
mij ≡ piii − piij
ϕi
=
1
4
− ϕiϕj
(ϕi + ϕj)2
=
(
ϕi − ϕj
2(ϕi + ϕj)
)2
∈ (0, 1/4] , for ij ∈ S2.
It then follows immediately that mij = mji and mii = 0. We can define the relative profitability
difference of two strategie, i and j, relative to a third strategy, k, by
mij(k) = mij −mik −mjk, ij ∈ S2 (23)
which is the difference between the profitability difference between strategies i and j, mij,
relative to the sum of the profit differences of both strategies i and j against a third strategy k.
As the ordering of conjectures is the same as the indexes in S1, e.g. ϕi < ϕj = ϕi+1, the signs
of mij(k) depend on the order of k relative to i and j. In general we have:
mij(k)
< 0 , if i < j < k or k < i < j≷ 0 , if i < k < j.
The equilibrium e∗ij for ij ∈ S2 is a Nash equilibrium only if all differences mij(k), for all k ∈ S1
excluding i and j, are non-positive.
We can associate three types of counting to the number of mij(k) differentials: (i) their total
number is the same as the number of combinations of ijk, that is C(n, 3) (which is the cardinality
of S3); (ii) kij is the maximum number of these differentials mij(k) which may be non-negative,
for a given pair of strategies ij ∈ S2; and (iii) k2 is the maximum number of non-negative
differentials for all ij ∈ S2. The key point here is that the last two numbers are just associated
with the ordering of indexes, but, nevertheless, give us a the maximum number of pairs ij which
may have a non-negative relative differential and hence may not be Nash equilibria.
We denote further by sij ∈ {0, . . . , kij}, the actual number of differentials which are positive,
for a given edge of index ij ∈ S2 and the total number of positive differentials by s2 ∈ {0, . . . , k2 },
for all indices ij ∈ S2. That is, s2 is the number of pairs ij which have at least one positive
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differential and so cannot be a Nash equilibrium, and an equilibrium in the edge eij has unstable
manifold of dimension sij + 1 if sij < kij this means that the equilibrium point e
∗
ij is a local
bifurcation point where the center manifold has maximum dimension kij − sij.
Proposition 3 introduces, for any possible combination of two conjectures drawn from a set of
possible n conjectures ϕ ∈ Φ, two numbers, s2 and k2, and a partition over Φ, {Φ20, . . . ,Φ2s2 , . . . ,Φ2k2},
such that Φ = ∪k2s2=0Φ2s2 , associated to the number equilibria e∗ij which are not Nash equilib-
ria. Clearly, some subsets of the partition may be empty: Φ20 is the subset of Φ for which all
mij(k)( ϕ) are negative and hence all stationary distributions are Nash equilibria. If Φ
2
0 = Φ
it means that s2 = k2 = 0, that is all the relative profitability differentials are negative; Φ
2
1 is
the subset of Φ such that s2 = 1 and there is only one pair ij with at least one profitability
difference mij(k)( ϕ) which is strictly positive, and all the others are non-positive, and there is
one stationary equilibria which is not Nash.
Proposition 3 also states that we can perform a further partition over every set Φ2s2 which is
non-empty, and is related to the number of differentials which are non-negative and are counted
by sij. This partition is related to the dimension of the local stable manifold.
The strategy space Φ is partioned into subsets Φ2s2 : depending on its location, ϕ will have an
associated s2 and sij which will determine the number of Nash equilibria and the dimension of
the local stable manifolds of the non-Nash stationary profiles locarted on the edges joinging the
verticese. Intuitively, if the initial population of CVs starts sufficiently closed to a mixed strategy
located at any one of the edges eij it will converge to e
∗
ij only if is located exactly over the local
stable manifold passing through e∗ij. However, the local stable manifold is a set of measure zero.
Generically, if the CV game starts close to eij the conjecture game solution will diverge away
and converge asymptotically to one of the two pure strategies ei or ej. Proposition 3 states that
there is a close association between the partition of the space of conjectures Φ, which is related
to the number of probability profiles in which the Nash property does not hold, {Φ2s2}k2s2=0, and a
bifurcation analysis associated to the dimension of the local stable manifold. Local bifurcations
are associated to the boundaries of two subsets in which the number of distributions which verify
the Nash property varies.
Third, we can also derive some general results for the mixed strategy stationary equilibria
located on the boundary of the simplex which is formed by the hyperplane (edges) joining any
three vertices, eijk. C(n, 3) is the number of combinations i < k < j : i 6= j 6= k. Then C(n, 3)
also counts the number, considering all the combinations, of relative profitability differences
mij(k) that can be non-negative, for all coefficients ijk such that they are all different. A new
partition over set Φ can be performed, {Φ2s3}C(n,3)s3=0 associated to the total number of ambiguously
signed relative profitability differences. Observe that partition {Φ2s2} involves unions of subsets
in the partition {Φ2s3}.
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We define a new magnitude involving relative profitability differences
mijk = mijmij(k)mkl +mikmil(j)mjl +mjkmjk(i)mil + 2mijmikmkl, l 6= i, k, l ∈ S1, (24)
and a new partition over set Φ
Φ3s3 = { ϕ ∈ Φ : there is at least one mijl(ϕ) > 0, l 6= i 6= j ∈ S1} , s3 ∈ {0, C(n, 3)}. (25)
Proposition 4. If there is a partition of Φ by non-empty sets {Φ2s3}C(n,3)s3=0 then there is an asso-
ciated multiplicity of stationary equilibrium distributions in which there are s3 ∈ 0, . . . , C(n, 3)
distributions of type z∗ = e∗ijk on the edges eijk ∈ ∆n−1. A stationary equilibrium distribution
e∗ijk is a Nash equilibrium if the associated coefficients mijl for l 6= i 6= j 6= k ∈ S1 are all
negative. If there is a partition of Φ by non-empty sets {Φ3s3}C(n,3)s3=0 then the maximum number
of Nash equilibria is {C(n, 3)− s3}C(n,3)s3=0 .
In Propositions 3 and 4 we found that here is a close relationship between the number of
stationary distributions in the edges eij, e
∗
ij, which are Nash equilibria, the dimension of the local
stable manifold for stationary distribution in eij and the number of stationary distributions on
edges eijk. This type of relationship holds further between the number of stationary distributions
on the edges eijk which are Nash equilibria, the dimension of the local stable manifold at e
∗
ijk
19
and the number of stationary distributions on edges eijkl. In this case a fixed point of F(z) = 0
will be of type
z =
(
zi =
ϕjϕkϕlmjkl
dijkl
, zj =
ϕiϕkϕlmikl
dijkl
, zk =
ϕiϕjϕlmijl
dijkl
zl =
ϕiϕjϕkmijk
dijkl
, zp = 0, p 6= i, j, k, l ∈ S1
)
(26)
where
dijkl = ϕiϕjϕkmijk + ϕiϕjϕlmijl + ϕiϕkϕlmikl + ϕjϕkϕl
mjkl
dijl
for all ijkl ∈ S4, that has C(n, 4) components. Again, z ∈ eijkl if all the components of type
mijk are negative.
Although we cannot go much beyond edges of type eijk a similar reasoning applies for mem-
bers of the boundary of ∆n−1 in which there are n− 4, n− 5, n− 1 zero components of z.
Since n is finite this suggests a conjecture over the existence of stationary distributions
belonging to the interior of ∆n−1:
19This will be clear in the n = 4 case outlined in the appendix.
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Conjecture. There is one interior stationary distribution zˆ only if there is a non-empty subset
of Φ such that there are stationary distributions belonging to all the C(n, n − 1) = n edges of
type e12...i, i ∈ S1, {e∗12...j}nj=1 and they are all Nash equilibria.
An interior distribution, if it exists, is a Nash equilibrium because u(zˆ) = u(zˆ).
Then the set of stationary equilibria of the replicator dynamics is
Z∗ = {{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , . . . , {e∗ijk}ijk∈S3 , . . . , {e∗123...i}123...i∈Sn−1 , zˆ},
if n is finite and the sequences up until n − 1 have only Nash equilibria on all the edges. If
there is not an equilibrium point for every edge, or there is an equilibrium point which is not
a Nash equilibrium, for edges with indices Si, then there are no stationary distributions over
edges indexed Si+1, for i = 2, . . . , n− 1. In this case stationary equilibrium set is
Z∗ = {{ei}i∈S1 , . . . , {e∗i112...iN}i112...iN∈SN},
where N is the maximum number of vertices which as connected by the edges in which there is
a fixed point {z ∈ ∂(∆n−1) : F(z) = 0}.
Therefore, stationary distributions are always multiple. Given an initial conjecture at time
t = 0, z(0), the dynamics of the conjecture game will generate convergence to a unique asymp-
totic distribution, z∗ ∈ Z∗. If the initial conjecture does not belong to a particular set of measure
zero (i.e., if it is not a bifurcation point) there will be asymptotic convergence to one of the pure
strategy profiles ei depending on the specific value of vector ϕ. We also show there is a close
connection between the global dynamic properties (i.e., the basin of attraction of ei) and the
probability of asymptotic convergence to ei, for any given initial mixed conjecture z(0).
5.2 Ex post consistency in the n conjecture game
Propositions 3 and 4 describe the set of all possible Nash equilibria in the conjecture game.
Since most of these are mixed-strategy equilibria (for n larger than 3), what can we say about
the ex post consistency of these possible equilibria? The first point to note is that insofar as
mixed equilibria are on the edges of the simplex, they involve subsets of k conjectures with
strictly positive probabilities and the complementary (n−k) conjectures being played with zero
probability. This enables us to place a lower bound on the probability of consistency:
Observation. With n distinct conjectures, if z∗ is a Nash-equilibrium and there are are k
strategies with strictly positive probabilties, then
PC (z∗) ∈ [ 1
k
, 1)
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Clearly, only the pure-strategy equilibria can be fully consistent with PC = 1.
5.3 The 3 conjecture case.
In section 3 we considered a specific 3 conjecture example: here, we consider the general 3
conjecture case. It provides an example of the n conjecture case and is also sufficiently simple
for us to undertake a full characterization of all equilibria. With n = 3, the indices sets are
S1 = {1, 2, 3} and S2 = {12, 13, 23}, and the conjecture space is Φ = {ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3}, with 0 ≤ ϕ1 <
ϕ2 < ϕ3 ≤ 2. The candidate probability profiles are z = ∆2. Probability profiles associated to
pure strategies belong to set {e1, e2, e3}. The three boundary profiles located at one of the three
edges of the simplex, excluding the vertices, are {e12, e13, e23}, where e12 = {z ∈ ∆2 : z3 = 0} ,
e13 = {z ∈ ∆2 : z2 = 0} and e23 = {z ∈ ∆2 : z1 = 0}, correspond to boundary mixed strategies
which are distinguished from the interior mixed strategies z ∈ Int(∆2).
Applying equation (23) we have relative profitability differences m12(3) < 0, m23(1) < 0 and
m13(2) = m13(2)(ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3) ≡ m13 − (m12 +m23), (27)
which has an ambiguous sign. Using the previous idea for the partition of Φ into sets Φ2s2 ,
we have the subset of Φ in which all the three profitability differences are non-positive Φ0 =
{ ϕ ∈ Φ : m13(2)(ϕ) ≤ 0}, and the subset in which there is one positive profitability difference
Φ1 = { ϕ ∈ Φ : m13(2)(ϕ) > 0}. Observe that
m13(2) ≤ 0⇔ ϕ33(ϕ2−ϕ1)−ϕ31(ϕ3−ϕ2)−9ϕ1ϕ2ϕ3(ϕ1 +ϕ3)−6ϕ1ϕ3(ϕ3ϕ1 +ϕ22)−ϕ22(ϕ21 +ϕ23) ≥ 0
where the first term is positive and all the others are negative.
Function m13(2) defined over (ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3), determines the number of stationary states and
whether or not they are Nash equilibria as given by the following proposition 20
Proposition 5 (Stationary profiles). (a) If ϕ ∈ Φ1 then there are six stationary probability
profiles
Z∗ = {e1, e2, e3, e∗12, e∗13, e∗23},
where
e∗12 ≡
(
ϕ2
ϕ1 + ϕ2
,
ϕ1
ϕ1 + ϕ2
, 0
)
, e∗13 ≡
(
ϕ3
ϕ1 + ϕ3
, 0,
ϕ1
ϕ1 + ϕ3
)
, e∗23 ≡
(
0,
ϕ3
ϕ2 + ϕ3
,
ϕ2
ϕ2 + ϕ3
)
which are all Nash equilibria, except for e∗13;
20Observe that ϕ1 = 0 (i.e. the Bertrand case) implies m13(2) < 0.
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(b) if ϕ ∈ int(Φ0) and ϕ1 > 0 then there are seven stationary population profiles:
Z∗ = {e1, e2, e3, e∗12, e∗13, e∗23, zˆ},
where
z∗ = zˆ ≡
(
ϕ2ϕ3m23m23(1)
d123
,
ϕ1ϕ3m13m13(2)
d123
,
ϕ1ϕ2m12m12(3)
d123
)
∈ int(∆2) (28)
where d123 ≡ ϕ1ϕ2m12m12(3) + ϕ1ϕ3m13m13(2) + ϕ2ϕ3m23m23(2) < 0. All stationary probability
profiles are Nash equilibria. If ϕ1 = 0 then Z∗ = {e1, e2, e3, e∗23} and there are all Nash equilibria;
(c) if ϕ ∈ ∂(Φ0) then there are six stationary profiles as described in (a) and they are all Nash
equilibria.
Figure 2 here
Clearly, the precise value of m13(2) is crucial in determining whether we have 1, 3 or 4 mixed
equilibria. We can take (31), and assume the three strategies are equally spaced, by setting
ϕ2 = 1, and plot a bifurcation diagram in the space of conjectures (ϕ1, ϕ3) in Figure 2. If we set
different values for φ the diagram will not change qualitatively. There are two bifurcation loci
{(ϕ1, ϕ3) : ϕ1 = 0} and {(ϕ1, ϕ3) : m13(2)(ϕ1, ϕ3) = 0}. The last set divides the conjecture space
into two: there is a small area where ϕ1 is less than 0.066, for which m13(2) < 0. Most of the
parameter space results in m13(2) > 0. This means that in the 3× 3 example the vast majority
of combinations of conjectures will yield only two boundary mixed equilibria with a third mixed
non-Nash boundary stationary point. In this sense, the interior mixed equilibrium is a rarity,
and requires one firm to have a very competitive conjecture (ϕ1 < 0.066). We can now see that
the example in section 3.2 where ϕ1 = 1 and ϕ3 = 2 is firmly in the region where m13(2) > 0, so
that there are only three stationary points on the edges and no interior equilibria..
Figure 3 here
We can think about the strategy profiles in terms of the unit-simplexes, depicted in Figure
3 21 for the cases not corresponding to bifurcations. The pure-strategy equilibria are on the
vertices: the most competitive is in the bottom right corner (z1 = 1 ), the least competitive at
the top (z3 = 1). All those equilibria are sinks.
21We have used Dynamo by Sandholm et al. (2010), to draw the phase diagrams.
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When m13(2) > 0 we have the generic simplex as depicted in Figure 3(a). There are
three partially mixed stationary states: one on each of the edges between the three vertices.
There are two stationary profiles e∗12 and e
∗
23 that involve conjecture ϕ2 with each of the other
two conjectures: these are both Nash equilibria and are saddle-points with the stable manifold
belonging to the interior of the simplex. Note that e∗12 is closer to e1 than e2 : this follows
because to equate the payoffs, the more competitive conjecture needs a higher probability of
meeting itself. Likewise, e∗23 is closer to e2 than e3. There is a third stationary state that is
not a Nash-equilibrium, which is a mixed profile with z3 = 0, and is a source.
When m13(2) < 0 we have the simplex as depicted in Figure 3(b). In this case, there are two
differences: first, the stationary mixed profile with z2 = 0 becomes a saddle-point stable Nash-
equilibrium, and secondly an additional interior mixed stationary state emerges, which is also a
Nash-equilibrium but is a source. Again the stable manifold associated to boundary equilibria
for z2 = 0 belongs to the interior of the simplex. When m13(2) ↓ 0, the mixed equilibria gets
closer to the interior mixed equilibrium in e13, and when m13(2) = 0 the two merge. In this case,
the boundary mixed equilibrium is a Nash-equilibrium. This property however does not show
up when m13(2) ↑ 0. This corresponds to a local bifurcation point of the fold type.
The next proposition formally assert that the local dynamics at the stationary points dis-
played at the two phase diagrams hold generically:
Proposition 6 (Local dynamics). The pure strategy Nash equilibria, e1, e2 and e3, are always
sinks, and the two boundary mixed Nash equilibria e∗12 and e
∗
23 are always saddle points. In
addition:
(a) if m13(2) > 0 then the boundary non-Nash stationary state e
∗
13 is a saddle point with a one-
dimensional stable manifold.
(b) If m13(2) < 0 two cases can occur: if ϕ1 > 0 then the boundary mixed Nash equilibrium e
∗
13
is a saddle point and the interior mixed Nash equilibrium zˆ is a source. If ϕ1 = 0, then e
∗
12, e
∗
13
and zˆ merge with e1, which is a fold bifurcation;
(c) if m13(2) = 0 then there is a local fold bifurcation at equilibrium point z
∗ = e∗13 = zˆ.
The dimension of the stable manifold reduces by one dimension if we consider the reduced
two-dimensional ODE equation.
Since a stationary point can only be an ESS if it is a sink, (Taylor and Jonker, 1978, p.
150), it follows that all of the mixed equilibria are not ESS and the probability of consistency
is strictly less than 1 : for the edge equilibria e∗12 and e
∗
23 and PC ∈ [12 , 1). If ϕ1 > 0, then
all three pure equilbria are ESS and PC = 1. Hence we can conlcude that PC = 1 only for
equilibria with k = 1.
22
5.4 Global dynamics in the 3 conjecture case.
Phase diagrams in Figure 3 displays not only local dynamics but also global dynamics, for the
two generic cases. It shows there is a heteroclinic network which is joining all the stationary
points of the replicator dynamics. Heteroclinic orbits exist in the intersection of the stable
manifold associated to one equilibrium point to the unstable manifold associated to another
equilibrium point. Therefore, there are heteroclinic orbits linking sinks to saddle points, in the
interior of the simplex, and saddle points to sinks, in the boundaries of the simplex. This implies
that the heteroclinic orbits in the interior of the simplex separate the basins of attractions of
the three pure strategy Nash equilibria
Bi ≡
{
y ∈ ∆2 : lim
t→∞
z(t,y) = ei
}
, i = 1, 2, 3.
Proposition 7 (Global dynamics). (a) Let m13(2) > 0. Then there is a heteroclinic network
composed of 8 heteroclinic orbits: six heteroclinic orbits join the boundary mixed equilibria to
the pure strategy equilibria, and two heteroclinic orbits join the steady state on edge e13 to
the boundary mixed equilibria on the edges e12 and e23. These two heteroclinics separate the
boundaries for the basins of attraction B1, B2 and B3 associated to the three pure strategies
equilibria e1, e2 and e3.
(b) Let m13(2) < 0. If ϕ1 > 0, then there is a heteroclinic network composed of 9 heteroclinic
orbits, six heteroclinic orbits join the boundary mixed equilibria to the pure strategy equilibria, and
three heteroclinic orbits join the interior mixed equilibrium, zˆ to the boundary mixed equilibrium
on the edges e13, e12 and e23. These three heteroclinics separate the basins of attraction B1, B2
and B3 associated to the three pure strategy equilibria e1, e2 and e3. If ϕ1 = 0, then there is a
heteroclinic network composed of 5 heteroclinic orbits, three heteroclinic orbits joining e1 to e2,
e3 and e23, and two heteroclinic orbits joining e23 to e2 and e3. The heteroclinic orbit between
e1 and e23 separates the basins of attraction B2 and B3. Basin B1 is empty.
From the above proposition, we can see that:
(a) Let ϕ1 > 0. The three pure-strategy equilibria are asymptotically stable, have fully
consistent conjectures (PC = 1) and are ESS. These properties hold for ϕ2 and ϕ3 even when
ϕ1 = 0
(b) None of the non-pure strategy fixed-points are asymptotically stable, ESS or have fully
consistent conjectures. The probability of consistency is at least 0.5 and strictly less than 1.
(c) The non-pure strategy fixed points are either unstable sources or saddle-stable with a stable
manifold of dimension 1.
We can see that the non-pure-strategy stationary states are on the borders of the basins of
attraction of the three pure-strategy equilibrium conjectures. The boundaries of the basins are
23
heteroclinic orbits which connect the ”mixed” stationary states with each other and with the
pure strategy equilibria. Hence, there is a sense in which the non-pure strategy stationary points
are ”fragile”: the replicator dynamics on the two dimensional simplex results in a stable manifold
of at most one dimension. This means that these stationary states are not locally stable, since
a small deviation will almost always lead away to one of the three pure-strategy sinks. Whilst
they are fragile in this sense, they are also essential to the model, as with their heteroclinic
orbits they define the boundaries between the basins of attraction of the pure-strategy sinks.
5.4.1 Equilibrium Selection with three conjectures.
Clearly, the evolutionary dynamics imply that the initial position determines which equilibrium
comes about in the long-run. However, what can we say about the size of the basins of
attraction? In particular, what determines the size of the basins of attraction? Does the Pareto
dominant equilibrium have a larger basin of attraction? If we consider each point in the unit
simplex to be equally likely, we can interpret the size of the basin as the probability of the
corresponding equilibrium. In the general case of m13(2) > 0, we are able to approximate each
basin under the assumption that the heteroclinic orbits are all linear, so that the three basins
can be broken down into triangles using Proposition 8 22. Let us call P(ei) the (approximate)
probability of asymptotic convergence to pure strategy ei. Our approximations are:
P(e1) =
ϕ21
(ϕ1 + ϕ2)(ϕ1 + ϕ3)
,
P(e2) =
ϕ2
ϕ1 + ϕ3
(
ϕ1
ϕ1 + ϕ2
+
ϕ3
ϕ2 + ϕ3
)
,
P(e3) =
ϕ23
(ϕ1 + ϕ3)(ϕ2 + ϕ3)
.
Since ϕ3 > ϕ1 we can see that the basin of attraction of the Pareto dominant equilibrium
e3 is larger than that of the most competitive equilibrium e1 : P(e3)/P(e1) = ϕ
2
3/ϕ
2
1 > 1 ⇒
P(e3) > P (e1). However, the relative size of P(e2) is more complicated to understand. To take
the simplest case, if ϕ1 = 0 (Bertrand), then the exact probabilities are
22We show in the proof of Proposition 8 that there is not an analytic first integral for the replicator dynamic
system and therefore the separatices of the basins of attraction cannot be determined analytically. However, we
also prove that they will be close to the straight lines connecting equilibria, which allows us to approximate of
the dimension of basins of attraction for the pure strategies.
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P(e3) =
ϕ3
(ϕ2 + ϕ3)
P(e2) =
ϕ2
(ϕ2 + ϕ3)
and so we have the unambiguous ranking P(e3) > P(e2). In general, however, it is more than
possible to have P(e3) < P(e2). In particular, as ϕ1 → ϕ3, then P(e1) and P(e3) both tend to
1/4 whilst P(e2) tends to 1/2. If we take another example with ϕ1 = 1 (Cournot) and ϕ3 = 2
(Joint profit maximization), then P(e2) > P(e3) for ϕ2 > 1.155.
Hence we cannot claim that the Pareto dominant equilibrium will have the largest basin. The
reason for this is due to the payoff function of the rent-extraction game. The most competitive
CV will do worst. The middle conjecture does better than the most cooperative when both
are played against the most competitive. Likewise, the middle conjecture does better than
the most competitive when both are played against the most cooperative. This was why (for
m13(2) > 0) the stationary point with only the most and least cooperative conjectures is not
a Nash equilibrium and is an unstable source. The result is that the basin of attraction for
the intermediate conjecture ϕ2 is often (although certainly not always) larger than the most
cooperative conjecture ϕ3.
There is also a key difference between the intermediate conjecture and the most cooperative.
If we look at Figure 3(a), we can see that for m13(2) > 0, if the population starts close to e23
but in B2, there are equilibrium paths that start with an almost zero share for ϕ2 but tend
asymptotically to e2 where the share is 1. The cooperative conjecture ϕ3 however requires a
minimum share to start off with. The lowest starting share for ϕ3 occurs on the boundary of B3
at stationary point e13: its initial share must be just above that at e13 for it to be able to get
to e1. So long as ϕ1 > 0, this is bounded away from zero.
6 Conclusion.
In this paper, we have taken the rent-extraction model with conjectural variations and applied
a social learning model to it in the form of the evolutionary replicator dynamics. CVs become
more (less) common as their average payoffs are above (below) average. The endpoints of
this evolutionary process can be both pure-strategy equilibria and mixed-strategy equilibria.
However, the mixed-equilibria are either unstable, or have limited saddle-path stability and
hence are not ESS. The pure-strategy equilibria have large basins of attraction, and their
boundaries are separated by heteroclinic orbits that connect the mixed-equilbria. Whilst all
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the pure-strategy equilibrium conjectures are consistent conjectures, the standard definition of
consistency does not apply to mixed equilibria.
We develop the concept of the ex post probability of consistency PC which generalizes the
conventional notion of consistency (PC = 1) to apply to mixed-strategies. Whilst only pure-
strategy equilibria can be consistent, we are able to find a simple lower bound for the ex-post
probability of consistency for mixed equilibria which is the reciprocal of the number of strategies
played with a strictly positive probability.
In our analysis of the rent-extraction game, we do not find a tendency for all of the rent
to be extracted in the evolutionary long-run. The rent is only fully dissipated when there are
competitive (Bertrand) conjectures, which are not ESS and will have no basin of attraction.
The Pareto-optimum of zero-rent dissipation is not only possible, but also has a significant basin
of attraction which in certain cases may be the biggest. However, in the three conjecture case
we have analyzed, the intermediate conjecture may well have the larger basin of attraction than
the Pareto-optimum. In the general n conjecture case, we find that there are two types if
stationary equilibria other than the pure-strategy ”corner” equilibria: there may be at most one
”interior” stationary point which will be a Nash-equilibrium in which all conjectures are played
with a strictly positive probability, which is a source. There are then many ”edge” stationary
points with less than n strategies played with a strictly positive probability. These can be either
Nash-equilibria with a stable manifold of dimension
There are very many shortcomings to using simple evolutionary dynamics: they certainly are
not a literal real-time representation of how agents behave. However, the long-run dynamics
give us a guide as to what social institutions and individual strategies might emerge over time.
In the case of the rent-extraction model they have given us an insight into what types of behavior
and associated beliefs will succeed in earning above average payoffs, and in so doing become
more common.
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A The 2 conjecture case
In this case z = (z1, z2) and Φ = (ϕ1, ϕ2) for 0 ≤ ϕ1 < ϕ2 ≤ 2. There ODE (21) has three
stationary equilibria, all belonging to the simplex ∆: two equilibria in the vertices z∗1 = e1 =
(1, 0), and z∗2 = e2 = (0, 1) one interior equilibrium z
∗
3 = zˆ = (ϕ2/(ϕ1 +ϕ2), ϕ1/(ϕ1 +ϕ2)). They
all belong to the simplex ∆ and verify the Nash property: u(e1) − u(e1) = (0,−ϕ1m12) < 0 ,
u(e2)− u(e2) = (−ϕ2m12, 0) < 0, and u(zˆ)− u(zˆ) = 0.
The spectra for the Jacobian F(z∗), evaluated at the three stationary equilibria are:
σ(e1) =
{
− ϕ1
4
,−ϕ1m12
}
, σ(e2) =
{
− ϕ2
4
,−ϕ2m12
}
and
σ(zˆ) =
{
ϕ1 + ϕ2
ϕ1ϕ2
m12,− ϕ1 + ϕ2
ϕ1ϕ2
(
1
2
−m12
)}
Then equilibria e1 and e2 are sinks and equilibrium zˆ is a saddle point.
Global dynamics properties are easier to obtain if we observe that, because the system should
lie on the manifold z1 + z2 = 1, the planar ODE (21) has an equivalent dynamic behavior as a
reduced scalar ODE
z˙1 = z1 (u1(z1, 1− z1)− u(z1, 1− z1)) = z1(1− z1)
(
z1 − ϕ2
ϕ1 + ϕ2
)
m12
together with z2 = 1− z1. We readily conclude that three types of dynamics can occur, if the
initial conjecture profile z(0) = (z1(0), z2(0)) is a mixed conjecture: (1) if 1/2 < ϕ2/(ϕ1 +ϕ2) <
z1(0) < 1 then limt→∞ z(t) = e1, (2) if ϕ2/(ϕ1 + ϕ2) < z1(0) < 1 then limt→∞ z(t) = e2 and (3)
if z1(0) = ϕ2/(ϕ1 +ϕ2) then z(t) = zˆ for any t ∈ [0,∞). Then the relative dimensions of the the
basins of attraction of the two pure strategy profiles, allows us to determine the probabilities of
convergence to each one of them, given any initial conjecture: P(e1) = ϕ1/(ϕ1 + ϕ2) < 1/2 and
P(e2) = ϕ2/(ϕ1 + ϕ2) < 1/2. As ϕ2 > ϕ1 then P(e2) > P(e1).
B The 4 conjecture case
Now the set of conjectures is four dimensional ϕ = {ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ4} where we assume that
0 < ϕ1 < ϕ2 < ϕ3 < ϕ4 ≤ 4 and z = (z1, z2, z3, z4)23.
In this case we have S2 = 6 profitability differentials of type mij ∈ [0, 1/4) and 12 relative
differentials of type mij(k), which are negative, with the exception of four, m13(2), m14(2), m14(3)
and m24(3). Then k2 = 4. We also have S3 = 4 functions of type mijk (see equation (24)) which
23We do not consider the case ϕ1 = 0, which should be obvious.
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have all ambiguous signs. We can define two partitions over Φ, { Φ20, . . . ,Φ24} and { Φ30, . . . ,Φ34}
such that ∪4s2=0Φ2s2 = ∪4s3=0Φ3s3 = Φ where Φ2s2 (Φ3s3) is the set of values of ϕ such that there are
s2 (s3) relative differentials mij(k) (mijk) which are positive. As we already saw, stationary equi-
librium profiles and their characteristics as regards the multiplicity of equilibria, Nash property
and local stability properties, depend on the local intersection of sets Φ2s2 and Φ
2
s3
.
In this section we apply proposition 5 specifically we derive analytical conditions for the
existence of equilibria in edges eijk and present a bifurcation analysis for the case in which we
have Nash equilibria.
Proposition 8 (Stationary profiles). The conjecture space can be partitioned into as much
as 32 (possibly empty) subsets. For a given set of conjectures ϕ ∈ Φ there is a set of stationary
equilibrium distributions, Z∗. Every Z∗ has the following general properties: (a) it contain
between 10 and 15 stationary elements, z∗; (b) every Z∗ contains all S1 vertices ei, everyone
of each verifies the Nash property; (c) every Z∗ contains points in all S2 edges eij; equilibria
e∗12, e
∗
23, e
∗
23 and e
∗
34 always verify the Nash property and e
∗
13, e
∗
14 and e
∗
24 only verify the Nash
property if there are particular equilibria in edges eijk: e
∗
13 is a Nash equilibrium if equilibrium
e∗123 exists, e
∗
14 is a Nash equilibrium if equilibria e
∗
124 and e
∗
134 exist, and e
∗
24 is a Nash equilibrium
if equilibrium e∗234 exists; (d) if Z∗ contains equilibria in any of the edges, e∗ijk ∈ eijk) then
this equilibrium verifies the Nash property; (e) half of the 32 steady state sets, if ϕ ∈ Φ30 ∪ Φ34,
contain the interior steady state z which is always a Nash. equilibrium
That is, we have 32 different combinations of multiple steady states, combining 10 to 15
stationary distributions. Just to illustrate we consider the two extreme cases 24. If ϕ ∈ Φ24 ∩
∪3s3=1Φ3s3 then Z∗ =
{ {ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2} has 10 elements which are Nash equilibria, with the
exception of e∗13, e
∗
14 and e
∗
24. If ϕ ∈ Φ24 ∩ Φ30 ∪ Φ34 then Z∗ =
{ {ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , zˆ}. If
ϕ ∈ Φ20 ∩ Φ30 ∪ Φ34 then Z∗ =
{ {ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , {e∗ijk}ijk∈S3 , zˆ} has 15 elements and they
are all Nash equilibria.
Figure 4 here
There is an very large number of combinations, therefore we took φ1 = −0.99 and φ4 = 0.9
and consider variations φ2 ∈ (−0.99, φ3) and φ3 ∈ (φ2, 0.9) just for illustration purposes, which
is depicted in Figure 4. This figure has three panels: the left diagram refers to partition {Φ2s2},
the center panel to partition {Φ3s3} and in the right panel there is a superimposition of the other
two, with a legend indicating which stationary profiles would exist. As φ2 < φ3 the top left part
of the graph is the only relevant.
24See the Appendix for a complete presentation of all the stationary distributions.
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On the left panel we observe that all sets Φ20 to Φ
2
4 are non-empty. These sets are divided by
combinations of the parameters such that the ambiguously signed differences mij(k) are equal
to zero. The subsets associated with the maximum and minimum number of stationary dis-
tributions on edges eijk are smaller and are located in the extremes of the graph: subset Φ
2
0,
associated with four distributions on those edges is on the left, four values of φ2 very close to
−1 and subset Φ24, associated with zero distributions on those edges is on the right, four values
of φ2 close to 1.
On the center panel we have subsets Φ3s3 . As, with the values of parameters in this example
we always have m123 < 0 and m234 < 0 then sets Φ
3
4 and Φ
3
3 are empty. Set Φ
3
0 is again very
small and holds for values of φ2 close to −1.
Then, in the right panel we present the multiple stationary distributions Z∗ that exist: Z1
, Z4, Z11 (in this case e∗13 is Nash), Z14 (e∗14 is Nash), Z20 (e∗14 is Nash), Z23 (e∗13 and e∗14 are
Nash), Z26 (e∗23 and e∗14 are Nash), Z27 (e∗13 and e∗14 are Nash), Z30 (e∗23 and e∗14 are Nash), Z32
(all Nash).
Proposition 9 (Local dynamics). We assume that ϕ1 > 0. For any value of ϕ ∈ Φ, the pure
strategy Nash equilibria, e1, e2, e3 and e4, are always sinks, with a four-dimensional local stable
manifold, and boundary mixed Nash equilibria e∗12 , e
∗
23 and e
∗
34 are saddle points, in which the
local stable manifold is of dimension three. In addition:
(a) if ϕ ∈ Φ20 then e∗13, e∗14 and e∗24 are also saddle points with three-dimensional local stable
manifolds; if ϕ ∈ Φ24 then e∗13, and e∗24 have two-dimensional local stable manifolds and e∗14 has
a one-dimensional stable manifold; if ϕ ∈ Φ21 ∪ Φ22 ∪ Φ23 the local stable manifolds of e∗13, and
e∗24 can be three or two-dimensional and the local stable manifolds of e
∗
14, can be three, two or
one-dimensional;
(b) if ϕ ∈ Φ30 then e∗123, e∗124, e∗134, and e∗234 are also saddle points with two-dimensional local
stable manifolds; if ϕ ∈ Φ34 their stable manifolds are all of dimension one; if ϕ ∈ Φ31 ∪ Φ32 ∪ Φ33
their local stable manifolds can be of dimension one or two. (c) if there is an interior distribution
profile, z, that is, if ϕ ∈ Φ30, its local stable manifold is of dimension one.
Again there is a close connection between the Nash property and stability properties for
distributions e∗ij and existence of probabilities e
∗
ijk, related to the signs of mij(k), and Nash
property and stability properties for eijk and existence of probabilities zˆ related to the signs of
mijk.
For example, if there is an equilibrium e∗13 profile in Z∗ if it is not Nash then the local stable
manifold is two-dimensional and there is not an equilibrium profile e∗123. However, if it is a
Nash equilibrium, then its local stable manifold is three-dimensional and there is an equilibrium
profile e∗123 as well.
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Again equilibria in the edges or in the interior belong to the boundaries between the basins of
attraction for the equilibria in the vertices. There is a generic convergence for one pure strategy
equilibrium, depending on the initial guess z(0). As in the 3 × 3 case, the difference between
cases in which the set of steady states Z∗ does not contain equilibrium profiles in the edges eijk,
as regards , cases in which it contains contains distributions in those edges or in the interior, is
that in the later case some vertices will become unreachable. In particular, the vertex associated
to the more competitive strategy e1 will have a larger basin of attraction in the latter case. As
we see in Figure 3 this case occurs only if the value for φ1 is very close to −1 and φ2 is also very
close to φ1..
C proofs.
C.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. As F(ei) = 0 and e
>
i 1 = 1 then z
∗ = ei ∈ Z∗, for any i ∈ S1. As ui(ei) = u(ei) and
uj(ei) − u(ei) = −ϕimij < 0 for any j 6= i 6= 1 ∈ S1, and uj(e1) − u(e1) ≤ 0. Then every ei is
a Nash equilibrium. The spectrum associated to the Jacobian F
′
(z) of equation (21), evaluated
locally at z = ei, is
σ(ei) ≡ σ(F′(ei)) = { − ϕimij}j∈S1 , i ∈ S1,
where mii = 1/4. For every i 6= 1 ∈ S1 , or if i = 1 and ϕ1 > 0, all the eigenvalues are negative,
and if i = 1 and ϕ1 = 0 then the spectrum σ(e1) is equal to zero. This means that all stationary
distributions in the vertices of ∆n−1 are locally sinks (the eigenvalues are real and the local
stable manifold has dimension n), except for the case in which ϕ1 = 0. In this case e1 is a fold
bifurcation point.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. By direct calculation, we determine the fixed points, located at hyperplanes eij belonging
to ∂∆n−1:
z∗ = e∗ij =
{
zi =
ϕj
ϕi + ϕj
, zj =
ϕi
ϕi + ϕj
, zk = 0, k 6= i, j ∈ S1
}
∈ eij ij ∈ S2.
(22)
Their number is equal to the cardinality of S2, C(n, 2).
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Every stationary equilibrium distribution e∗ij verifies:
uk(e
∗
ij)− u(e∗ij) =
0, if k = i, or k = j ∈ S1ϕiϕj
ϕi+ϕj
mij(k), if k 6= i, j ∈ S1.
The Nash property holds for a particular pair ij ∈ S2 if all differences mij(k), for k running
along S1, are non-positive. Using our previous definitions and notations, we have potentially
kij positive mij(k) for every ij ∈ S2 and k2 pairs ij in which the Nash property does not hold
(i.e., there are k2 pairs such that mij(k) > 0). Consider our definition of sets {Φ2s2}k2s2=0. If Φ0 is
non-empty, then there is a subset of measure different from zero of Φ such that all n(n − 1)/2
equilibria e∗ij are Nash. If Φ1 is non-empty then there is a subset of parameter values such that
there are n(n − 1)/2 − 1 Nash equilibria and one non-Nash equilibrium. If Φ2 is non-empty
then there is a subset of parameter values such that there are n(n − 1)/2 − 2 Nash equilibria
and two non-Nash equilibrium. Generally, if set Φs2 , for s2 = 0, . . . , k2 is non-empty there are
n(n−1)/2− s2 Nash equilibria and s2 non-Nash equilibrium. In the boundary between two sets
Φ2i ∩ Φ2j there is a profitability differential which is equal to zero.
The spectrum of the Jacobian of equation (21) evaluated at e∗ij is
σ(e∗ij) =
{
ϕiϕj
ϕi + ϕj
mij,
ϕiϕj
ϕi + ϕj
(
mij − 1
2
)
,
ϕiϕj
ϕi + ϕj
mij(k),
k 6= i, j ∈ S1} , for all ij ∈ S2 (29)
All the eigenvalues are real numbers, the first eigenvalue is always positive, the second is
always negative and among the other n− 2 eigenvalues there are kij eigenvalues which may be
potentially positive for any ϕ ∈ Φ. Therefore e∗ij is locally a generalized saddle point in which
the dimension of the stable manifold is equal to n−1 or is smaller. Observe that the expressions
for uk(e
∗
ij)−u(e∗ij) for k 6= i, j ∈ S1 and for the last n−2 eigenvalues are exactly the same. Then
the same partition {Φ2s2} is an unfolding of parameter space associated to the dimension of the
stable manifold: if ϕ ∈ int(Φ2s2) then the local stable manifold associated to e∗ij is of dimension
n − 1 − sij , for sij ∈ {0, . . . , kij}. In the boundary between two sets Φ2i ∩ Φ2j there is a fold
bifurcation and the spectrum σ(e∗ij) contain at least one zero eigenvalue.
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C.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. If we set n−3 elements of the vector z equal to zero, there are fixed points n(n−1)(n−2)/6
of F(z) = 0 of the form
z =
(
zi =
ϕjϕkmjkmjk(i)
dijk
, zj =
ϕiϕkmikmik(j)
dijk
, zk =
ϕjϕjmijmij(k)
dijk
, zl = 0, l 6= i, j, k ∈ S1
)
where dijk = ϕiϕjmijmij(k) + ϕiϕkmikmik(j) + ϕjϕjmjkmjk(i) These vectors clearly verify the
summing up condition for a distribution z>1S2 = 0. Another condition for z ∈ eijk, is that all
the three components of z are positive, which in this case holds if all mij(k) have the same sign.
However, given the combinations of the indices involved, there is is always one term mij(k) which
has an ambiguous sign, and all the other are always negative. This means that in general z is
not a distribution. As there are, overall C(n, 3) relative differences in which the sign of mij(k)
are ambiguous (for all combinations without repetitions of ijk), then we can define a partition
{ Φ2s3}C(n,3)s3=0 over the set Φ such that there ate s3 = 0, . . . C(n, 3) profitability differences mij(k)
which are non-positive. If the set Φ2s3 is non-empty, then there are C(n, 3) − s3 stationary
equilibrium distributions z∗ = e∗ijk, belonging to the edges linking vertices i, j and k.
For the stationary equilibrium distribution belonging to ∂(∆n−1), z∗ = e∗ijk we can check if it
is a Nash-equilibria by evaluating the sign of vector u(e∗ijk)− u(e∗ijk). For every e∗ijk we obtain,
ul(e
∗
ijk)− u(e∗ijk) =
0, if l = i, or l = j, or l = k ∈ S1− ϕiϕjϕl
ϕi+ϕj+ϕl
mijl
dijl
, if l 6= i, j, k ∈ S1.
where dijk < 0 if z
∗ = e∗ijk (otherwise it will not be a distribution), and mijk is given by equation
(24). This allows us to define a further partition over Φ, { Φ3s3}C(n,3)s3=0 associated to the number of
functions mijk which are positive. Therefore stationary equilibrium distributions which have the
Nash property belong to the inclusions of related subsets Φ2s3 and Φ
3
s3
such that z∗ = e∗ijk and
all the associated mijk are non-positive. That is, there is a maximum of C(n, 3)− s3 stationary
distributions , e∗ijk, which are Nash equilibria.
C.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. The ODE (21) has seven stationary equilibria where six equilibria are in the simplex
∆2, for any value of the conjectures. There are three equilibria in the vertices of the simplex,
z1 = e1, z2 = e2, z3 = e3, and other three equilibria in the edges z4 = e
∗
12 = (ϕ2/(ϕ1 +
ϕ2), ϕ1/(ϕ1 + ϕ2), 0) ∈ e12, z5 = e∗13 = (ϕ3/(ϕ1 + ϕ3), 0, ϕ1/(ϕ1 + ϕ3)) ∈ e13, and z6 = e∗23 =
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(0, ϕ3/(ϕ2 + ϕ3), ϕ2/(ϕ2 + ϕ3)) ∈ e23. There is another fixed point
z7 =
(
ϕ2ϕ3
ϕ2 + ϕ3
(
m23m23(1)
dˆ
)
,
ϕ1ϕ3
ϕ1 + ϕ3
(
m13m13(2)
dˆ
)
,
ϕ1ϕ2
ϕ1 + ϕ2
(
m12m12(3)
dˆ
) )
where
dˆ ≡ ϕ1ϕ2m12m12(3) + ϕ1ϕ3m13m13(2) + ϕ2ϕ3m23m23(1).
We readily see that z>7 1 = 1. However, applying equation (23) we have, for any value of the
parameters in Φ,
m12(3) ≡ m12 −m13 −m23 < 0 (30)
m13(2) ≡ m13 −m12 −m23 ≷ 0 (31)
m23(1) ≡ m23 −m12 −m13 < 0 (32)
then, in general this stationary equilibria may not belong to the simplex. A necessary and
sufficient condition for z7 to be in the unit simplex is that m13(2) ≤ 0. However, if m13(2) = 0
then z7 = e13 which means that this is a singularity. If m13(2) < 0 then z7 = zˆ ∈ int(∆2) and
z7 is a stationary equilibrium of the RD. If m13(2) > 0 then z7 will not be a stationary RD
equilibrium point (although it is a fixed point of F(z) = 0).
The Nash property for equilibria can be assessed from the vectors u(z∗) − u(z∗) where
z∗ is an equilibrium of the RD. Then u(e1) − u(e1) = (0,−ϕ1m12,−ϕ1m13), u(e2) − u(e2) =
(−ϕ2m12, 0,−ϕ2m23), u(e3)−u(e3) = (−ϕ3m13,−ϕ3m23, 0) u(e∗12)−u(e∗12) = (0, 0, ϕ1ϕ2m12(3)/(ϕ1+
ϕ2)), u(e
∗
13)− u(e∗13) = (0, ϕ1ϕ3m13(2)/(ϕ1 + ϕ3), 0), u(e∗23)− u(e∗23) = (ϕ2ϕ3m23(1)/(ϕ2 + ϕ3)),
and u(z7)− u(z7) = 0. All the vectors are non-positive, except for the case of e∗13: if m13(2) ≤ 0
then it is Nash equilibrium, if m13(2) > 0 it is not.
Then if ϕ ∈ int(Φ0) then there are seven equilibrium points in the simplex, and all of
them are Nash equilibria. If ϕ ∈ ∂(Φ0) there are six equilibrium points all or them are Nash
equilibrium, although equilibria e∗13 and z7 coalesce. ϕ ∈ Φ1 then there are six equilibrium
points, all belonging to the edges and vertices of the simplex, in which all are Nash equilibria,
except for the case of e∗13.
C.5 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. The spectra of the Jacobian of 3-dimensional ODE, (21), F
′
(z∗), evaluated at the equi-
librium points are:
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1. for the equilibria in the vertices, the Jacobian
σ(e1) =
{
− ϕ1
4
,−ϕ1m12,−ϕ1m13
}
σ(e2) =
{
− ϕ2
4
,−ϕ2m12,−ϕ2m23
}
σ(e3) =
{
− ϕ3
4
,−ϕ3m13,−ϕ3m23
}
.
are all negative and real, for every equilibria, then all the vertices are sinks;
2. for the equilibria located in the edges, the Jacobian has the eigenvalues
σ(e∗12) =
{
ϕ1γ2
ϕ1 + ϕ2
(
m12 − 1
2
)
,
ϕ1ϕ2
ϕ1 + ϕ2
m12,
ϕ1ϕ2
ϕ1 + ϕ2
m12(3)
}
σ(e∗13) =
{
ϕ1ϕ3
ϕ1 + ϕ3
(
m13 − 1
2
)
,
ϕ1ϕ3
ϕ1 + ϕ3
m13,
ϕ1ϕ3
ϕ1 + ϕ3
m13(2)
}
σ(e23) =
{
ϕ2ϕ3
ϕ2 + ϕ3
(
m23 − 1
2
)
,
ϕ2ϕ3
ϕ2 + ϕ3
m23,
ϕ2ϕ3
ϕ2 + ϕ3
m23(1)
}
the first eigenvalue is negative and the second is positive for the three equilibria. How-
ever, while for for equilibria e∗12 and e
∗
23 the third eigenvalue is negative as well, the last
eigenvalue for e∗13 has the same sign as m13(2). Then, all the equilibria in the edges are
generalized saddle points: at e∗12 and e
∗
23 the local stable manifold has dimension two and
at e∗13 the local stable manifold has dimension two if ϕ ∈ int(Φ0) and has dimension one
if ϕ ∈ Φ1, at it is a fold bifurcation point if ϕ ∈ ∂Φ0;
3. the spectrum of the Jacobian for the last equilibria are:
σ(zˆ) =
{
−ϕ1ϕ2ϕ3
4dˆ
(
m12m12(3) +m13m13(2) +m23m23(1) + 2m12m13m23
)
,
−ϕ1ϕ2ϕ3
4dˆ
m12m13m23
(
1 + ∆1/2
)
,−ϕ1ϕ2ϕ3
4dˆ
m12m13m23
(
1−∆1/2)} (33)
where the discriminant is ∆ ≡ 1 + m12(3)m13(2)m23(1)/m12m13m23. If ϕ ∈ int(Φ0), which
is the same condition for z7 ∈ int(∆2) then dˆ < 0 and the discriminant is positive, then
all the three eigenvalues are real and and two are positive and one is negative, and the
interior point is a saddle with a one-dimensional stable manifold.
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C.6 Proof of Proposition 7.
Proof. Again, as in the 2× 2 case it is convenient to study the 3-dimensional ODE, (21) on the
simplex by the equivalent 2-dimensional projection of the dynamic system (21) into, v.g., the
space (z1, z3) by the relation z2 = 1− z1 − z3,
z˙1 = z1 [(1− z1 − z3) (−ϕ2m12 +m12(ϕ1 + ϕ2)z1 +m23(ϕ2 + ϕ3)z3) +
+m13z3((ϕ1 + ϕ3)z1 − ϕ3)] (34)
z˙3 = z3 [(1− z1 − z3) (−ϕ2m23 +m12(ϕ1 + ϕ2)z1 +m23(ϕ2 + ϕ3)z3) +
+m13z1((ϕ1 + ϕ3)z3 − ϕ1)] . (35)
We obtain equivalent results if we study the local dynamics from the ones we derived in the proof
of proposition 6 The steady states of this reduced system are obtained as z∗ = (z∗1 , 1−z∗1−z∗3 , z∗3),
J(z∗1 , z
∗
3). The spectra for the Jacobian evaluated at the different steady states, as the system
is 2-dimensional, contains eigenvalues which are equal to the last two we have obtained in the
proof of proposition 6 .
In order to characterize global dynamics we have to completely describe phase diagram.
Zeeman (1980) presents a complete classification of the phase portraits of the replicator dynamics
(RD) for the 3 × 3 case. They include the phase portraits in Figure 3. These phase portraits
suggest there is a heteroclinic network which is not an heteroclinic cycle as in some RD games
(e.g., the rock - scissor -paper RD game). The heteroclinic network consists of six heteroclinic
orbits joining equilibria on the edges, e12, e13 and e23, to equilibria on the vertices of the simplex,
e1, e2 and e3, and two interior heteroclinic orbits joining steady state e
∗
13 to steady states e
∗
12,
and e∗23, respectively. Those two heteroclinic orbits separate the boundaries of the basins of
attractions in the interior of ∆2. Next we prove that the phase diagram in Figure ??, for case
m13(2) > 0, is generic. The proof for case m13(2) < 0 is similar.
Heteroclinic orbits lay along invariants of type {(z1, z2, z3) : F (z1, z2, z3) = constant}. The
best way to prove that their layout as in Figure 3 is generic, is to determine a first integral
of the RD system (21) explicitly. If we transform the 3-dimensional RD system (21) into a
2-dimensional Lotka-Volterra (LV) system, using a well known transformation (see (Hofbauer
and Sigmund, 1998, p.77), and if we draw upon the relevant literature on the determination of
the first integrals of the LV equation, e.g. Llibre and Valls (2007), we find that there is not an
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analytic first integral for the associated LV equation.
Therefore we resort to a heuristic proof by using equations (34)-(35).
The orbits along the edges of the simplex lay along invariants {(z1, z3) : z1 = 0} , {(z1, z3) :
1− z1 − z3 = 0} , and {(z1, z3) : z3 = 0} . In the first case the dynamics is given by z˙1 = 0 and
z˙3 = z3(1− z3)(z3 − z3(e23))m23(ϕ2 + ϕ3), which means that z1(t) = 0, for any t ≥ 0 and if 0 <
z3(0) < z3(e
∗
23) (1 > z3(0) > z3(e
∗
23)) then z3(t) will converge asymptotically to vertex e2 (e3). In
the second case the dynamics is given by z˙3 = −z˙1 and z˙1 = z1(1− z1)(z1− z1(e13)m13(ϕ1 +ϕ3),
which means that z3(t) = 1−z1(t), for any t ≥ 0, and if 0 < z1(0) < z1(e∗13) (1 > z1(0) > z1(e∗13))
then the trajectory z1(t) will converge asymptotically to vertex e1 (e3). In the last case, the
dynamics is given by z˙3 = 0 and z˙1 = z1(1 − z1)(z1 − z1(e12)m12(ϕ1 + ϕ2), which means that
z3(t) = 0, for t ≥ 0, and if 0 < z1(0) < z1(e∗12) (1 > z1(0) > z1(e∗12)) then the trajectory z1(t)
will converge asymptotically to vertex e1 (e2).
Next, we prove that, if m13(2) > 0 there are two heteroclinic orbits inside a closed trapping
area T which is bounded by equilibrium points e2, e∗12, e∗13, and e∗23:
T =
{
(z1, z3) : z1 ≥ 0, z3 ≥ 0, −ϕ2 + (ϕ1 + ϕ3)z1
ϕ3 − ϕ2 ≤ z3 ≤
ϕ2(1− z1) + ϕ1
ϕ2 + ϕ3
}
.
As we already saw, all the points belonging to segments of the edges e2-e12, and e2-e23, converge
to the pure strategy steady state e2. By continuity, given any initial point close to the those
edges, the replicator dynamics will also imply asymptotic convergence to e2. However, all the
dynamics starting close to the straight line e12 − e13, passing through points e∗13 and e∗12, will
exit T and converge to vertex e1. Similarly, all the dynamics starting close to the straight line
e13− e23, passing through points e∗13 and e∗23, will exit T and converge to vertex e3. This means
that there are two separatrices belonging to the interior of T: the first is in the intersection of the
stable manifold associated to the saddle point e∗12 with the unstable manifold associated with
the source e∗13, W
s(e∗12) ∩W u(e∗13); and the second is in the intersection of the stable manifold
associated to the saddle point e∗23 with the unstable manifold associated with the source e
∗
13,
W s(e∗23) ∩W u(e∗13).
Those separatrices partition T in three subsets, where there will be asymptotic convergence
towards one and only one of the three vertices of the simplex. The subset associated to e2 is the
basin os attraction of e2 and the other subsets of T belong to the basins of attraction of e1 or e3.
The separatrices are invariants and contain all the heteroclinic orbits converging asymptotically
to either e∗12 or e
∗
23.
To prove this formally, observe that the formal expression of line e13 − e12 is
z3 = − ϕ2
ϕ3 − ϕ2 +
ϕ1 + ϕ3
ϕ3 − ϕ2 z1 : (z1, z3) ∈ T
39
which is positively sloped. Evaluating equations (34)-(35) along that line we get
z˙1 = z1
(ϕ1 + ϕ2)(ϕ1 + ϕ3)
(ϕ3 − ϕ2)2 (z1 − z1(e
∗
13)) (z1 − z1(e∗12))
(
ϕ2m12(3) + ϕ3m13(2)
)
> 0
z˙3 =
(ϕ1 + ϕ2)
2(ϕ1 + ϕ3)
(ϕ3 − ϕ2)3 (z1 − z1(e
∗
13)) (z1 − z1(e∗12))
[(
ϕ2m12(3) + ϕ3m13(2)
)
z1 +
2ϕ2ϕ3m23
ϕ1 + ϕ2
]
< 0.
Then the vector field is negatively sloped along line e13 − e12 and, locally, z1 is increasing and
z3 is decreasing towards e1. Therefore, the global dynamics involves exit from trapping area T.
The formal expression of line e13 − e23 is
z3 =
ϕ2
ϕ2 + ϕ3
− ϕ2 − ϕ1
ϕ2 + ϕ3
z1 : (z1, z3) ∈ T
which is negatively sloped. Evaluating equations (34)-(35) along that line we get
z˙1 = z1 (z1 − z1(e∗13))
(ϕ1 + ϕ3)
(ϕ2 + ϕ3)
(
ϕ2m23(1)(z1 − 1) + ϕ1m13(2)z1
)
< 0
and
z˙3 = z1 (z1 − z1(e∗13))
(ϕ1 + ϕ3)
(ϕ2 + ϕ3)2
(ϕ2(1− z1) + ϕ1z1)
(
ϕ2m23(1) + ϕ1m13(2)
)
> 0
which implies that the slope of the vector field along the line e13− e23 is also negative. But the
slope of the vector field is steeper than the slope of line e13 − e23, because
dz3
dz1
∣∣∣∣
(z˙1,z˙3)
− dz3
dz1
∣∣∣∣
e13−e12
=
2ϕ1ϕ2m12
(ϕ2 + ϕ3)
(
ϕ2m23(1)(1− z1) + ϕ1m13(2)z1
) < 0.
Then, locally, z1 is decreasing and z3 is increasing towards e3. Therefore, the global dynamics
also involves exit from trapping area T.
At last, we prove that the separatrices lay inside the trapping area T. First, recall that
the stable eigenspaces, Es(e∗12) and E
s(e∗23), are tangent to the stable manifolds associated to
the two boundary saddle points, e∗12 and e
∗
23. This means that the heteroclinic trajectories are
asymptotically tangent to the stable eigenspaces. The stable eigenspace associated to e∗12 has
slope
dz3
dz1
∣∣∣∣
Es(e∗12)
=
(ϕ1 + ϕ2)(m13 +m23)
(m13 −m23)ϕ3 − (m13 +m23)ϕ2
which is positive if (ϕ21 + ϕ
2
3)ϕ2 − 2ϕ1ϕ23 > 0, and is negative or vertical otherwise. In the
second case, the separatrix is clearly inside T. However, the separatrix is also inside T when it
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is positively sloped, because it is steeper than line e13 − e12, as, in this case,
dz3
dz1
∣∣∣∣
Es(e∗12)
− dz3
dz1
∣∣∣∣
e13−e12
=
ϕ3(ϕ1 + ϕ2)(ϕ1 + ϕ3)
2
(ϕ21 + ϕ
2
3)ϕ2 − 2ϕ1ϕ23
> 0
The stable eigenspace associated to e∗23 is also negatively sloped, because
dz3
dz1
∣∣∣∣
Es(e∗23)
= −(m12 −m13)ϕ1 + (m12 +m13)ϕ2
(ϕ2 + ϕ3)(m12 +m13)
< 0.
Again, it is inside T because it is steeper than line e13 − e23 as
dz3
dz1
∣∣∣∣
Es(e∗23)
− dz3
dz1
∣∣∣∣
e13−e23
= −2 ϕ1m12
(ϕ1 + ϕ3)(m12 +m13)
> 0.
In the case of m13(2) < 0, the proof is similar in the case of ϕ1 > 0. If ϕ1 = 0, we have the
additional factor of the merging of equilibria (Proposition 6) and resultant fold bifurcation and
disappearance of B1.
C.7 Proof of Proposition 8.
Proof. The ODE system (21) for the case in which both z and ϕ are four dimensional, has fifteen
stationary points, in which five may not be located in the simplex ∆3 for any value of ϕ ∈ Φ.
First, there are ten stationary points which are always located in the vertices of the simplex
z1 = e1, z2 = e2, z3 = e3, and z4 = e4 and six stationary points are located in the hyperplanes
belonging to ∂∆4 connecting two vertices, z5 = e
∗
12, z6 = e
∗
13, z7 = e
∗
14, z8 = e
∗
23, z9 = e
∗
24 and
z10 = e
∗
34, where
e∗12 =
(
ϕ2
ϕ1 + ϕ2
,
ϕ1
ϕ1 + ϕ2
, 0, 0
)
∈ e12, e∗13 =
(
ϕ3
ϕ1 + ϕ3
, 0,
ϕ1
ϕ1 + ϕ3
, 0
)
∈ e13,
e∗14 =
(
ϕ4
ϕ1 + ϕ4
, 0, 0,
ϕ1
ϕ1 + ϕ4
)
∈ e14, e∗23 =
(
0,
ϕ3
ϕ2 + ϕ3
,
ϕ2
ϕ2 + ϕ3
, 0
)
∈ e23,
e∗24 =
(
0,
ϕ4
ϕ2 + ϕ4
, 0,
ϕ2
ϕ2 + ϕ4
)
∈ e24, e∗34 =
(
0, 0,
ϕ4
ϕ3 + ϕ4
,
ϕ3
ϕ3 + ϕ4
)
∈ e34
Second, the next five stationary points may not be belong to the simplex. Among them,
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there are four that can be potentially located in ∂∆3, in hyperplanes joining three vertices:
z11 =
(
ϕ2ϕ3m23,m23(1)
d123
,
ϕ1ϕ3m13,m13(2)
d123
,
ϕ1ϕ2m12,m12(3)
d123
, 0
)
,
z12 =
(
ϕ2ϕ4m24,m24(1)
d124
,
ϕ1ϕ4m14,m14(2)
d124
, 0,
ϕ1ϕ2m12,m12(4)
d124
)
,
z13 =
(
ϕ3ϕ4m34,m34(1)
d134
, 0
ϕ1ϕ4m14,m14(3)
d134
,
ϕ1ϕ3m13,m13(4)
d134
)
,
z14 =
(
0,
ϕ3ϕ4m34,m34(2)
d234
,
ϕ2ϕ4m24,m24(3)
d234
,
ϕ2ϕ3m23,m23(4)
d234
)
,
where, using the expressions for m12(3), m13(2) and m23(1) and signs already derived in (30), (31)
and (32), and the general rule presented in equation (23),
m12(4) ≡ m12 −m14 −m24 < 0, m14(2) ≡ m14 −m12 −m24 ≷ 0
m24(1) ≡ m24 −m12 −m14 < 0, m13(4) ≡ m13 −m14 −m34 < 0
m14(3) ≡ m14 −m13 −m34 ≷ 0, m34(1) ≡ m34 −m13 −m14 < 0
m23(4) ≡ m23 −m24 −m34 < 0, m24(3) ≡ m24 −m23 −m34 ≷ 0
m34(2) ≡ m34 −m23 −m24 < 0,
and
d123 ≡ ϕ1ϕ2m12m12(3) + ϕ1ϕ3m13m13(2) + ϕ2ϕ3m23m23(1)
d124 ≡ ϕ1ϕ2m12m12(4) + ϕ1ϕ4m14m14(2) + ϕ2ϕ4m24m24(1)
d134 ≡ ϕ1ϕ3m13m13(4) + ϕ1ϕ4m14m14(3) + ϕ3ϕ4m34m34(1)
d234 ≡ ϕ1ϕ2m12m12(4) + ϕ1ϕ4m14m14(2) + ϕ2ϕ4m24m24(1)
Then z11 = e
∗
123 if m13(2) ≤ 0, z12 = e∗124 if m14(2) ≤ 0, z13 = e∗134 if m14(3) ≤ 0, and z14 = e∗234 if
m24(3) ≤ 0.
The last fixed point is
z15 =
(
ϕ2ϕ3ϕ4m234
dˆ
,
ϕ1ϕ3ϕ4m134
dˆ
,
ϕ1ϕ2ϕ4m124
dˆ
,
ϕ1ϕ2ϕ3m123
dˆ
)
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where
m234 ≡ m23m23(4)m14 +m24m24(3)m13 +m34m34(2)m12 + 2m23m24m34
m134 ≡ m13m13(4)m24 +m14m14(3)m23 +m34m34(1)m12 + 2m13m14m34
m124 ≡ m12m12(4)m34 +m14m14(2)m23 +m24m24(1)m13 + 2m12m14m24
m123 ≡ m12m12(3)m34 +m13m13(2)m24 +m23m23(1)m14 + 2m12m13m23
and
dˆ ≡ ϕ2ϕ3ϕ4m234 + ϕ1ϕ3ϕ4m134 + ϕ1ϕ2ϕ4m124 + ϕ1ϕ2ϕ3m123.
Then z15 = zˆ if sign(m123) = sign(m124) = sign(m134) = sign(m234).
The two partitions of Φ have the following subsets. The first partition involves mij(k), in
which we only report the cases in which mij(k) are ambiguous (all the other mij(k) are negative):
Φ24 ≡ {ϕ ∈ Φ : m13(2) > 0,m14(2) > 0,m14(3) > 0,m24(3) > 0}
Φ23 ≡
{
ϕ ∈ Φ : m13(2) > 0,m14(2) > 0,m14(3) > 0, or m13(2) > 0,m14(2) > 0,m24(3) > 0, or
or m13(2) > 0,m14(3) > 0,m24(3) > 0, or m14(2) > 0,m14(3) > 0,m24(3) > 0
}
(36)
Φ22 ≡
{
ϕ ∈ Φ : m13(2) > 0,m14(2) > 0, or m13(2) > 0,m14(3) > 0, or m13(2) > 0,m24(3) > 0, or
or m14(2) > 0,m14(3) > 0, or m14(2) > 0,m24(3) > 0, or m14(3) > 0,m24(3) > 0
}
(37)
Φ21 =
{
ϕ ∈ Φ : m13(2) > 0, or m14(2) > 0, or m14(3) > 0 or m24(3) > 0
}
.
and
Φ20 =
{
ϕ ∈ Φ : mij(k) ≤ 0 for i 6= j 6= k ∈ S1 × S1 × S1
}
The second partition involves mij(k), in which we only report the cases in which mij(k) are
ambiguous (all the other mij(k) are negative):
Φ34 ≡ {ϕ ∈ Φ : m123 > 0,m124 > 0,m134 > 0,m234 > 0}
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Φ33 ≡ {ϕ ∈ Φ : m123 ≤ 0,m124 > 0,m134 > 0,m234 > 0, or
or m123 > 0,m124 ≤ 0,m134 > 0,m234 > 0, or m123 > 0,m124 > 0,m134 ≤ 0,m234 > 0, or
or m123 > 0,m124 > 0,m134 > 0,m234 ≤ 0}
Φ32 ≡ {ϕ ∈ Φ : m123 ≤ 0,m124 ≤ 0,m134 > 0,m234 > 0, or
or m123 ≤ 0,m124 > 0,m134 ≤ 0,m234 > 0, or m123 ≤ 0,m124 > 0,m134 > 0,m234 ≤ 0, or
or m123 > 0,m124 ≤ 0,m134 ≤ 0,m234 > 0, or m123 > 0,m124 ≤ 0,m134 > 0,m234 ≤ 0,
or m123 > 0,m124 > 0,m134 ≤ 0,m234 ≤ 0}
Φ31 ≡ {ϕ ∈ Φ : m123 ≤ 0,m124 ≤ 0,m134 ≤ 0,m234 > 0, or
or m123 ≤ 0,m124 ≤ 0,m134 > 0,m234 ≤ 0, or m123 ≤ 0,m124 > 0,m134 ≤ 0,m234 ≤ 0, or
or m123 > 0,m124 ≤ 0,m134 ≤ 0,m234 ≤ 0}
and
Φ30 ≡ {ϕ ∈ Φ : m123 ≤ 0,m124 ≤ 0,m134 ≤ 0,m234 ≤ 0}.
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Next we present all the possible 32 candidate steady states: Z∗ = {z ∈ ∆2 : F(z) = 0}:
Z1 ≡
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2} ,
Z2 ≡
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , zˆ} ,
Z3 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗123} ,
Z4 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗124} ,
Z5 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗134} ,
Z6 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗234} ,
Z7 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗123, zˆ} ,
Z8 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗124, zˆ} ,
Z9 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗134, zˆ} ,
Z10 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗234, zˆ}
Z11 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗123, e∗124} ,
Z12 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗123, e∗134} ,
Z13 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗123, e∗234} ,
Z14 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗124, e∗134} ,
Z15 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗124, e∗234} ,
Z16 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗134, e∗234} ,
Z17 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗123, e∗124, zˆ} ,
Z18 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗123, e∗134, zˆ} ,
Z19 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗123, e∗234, zˆ} ,
Z20 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗124, e∗134, zˆ} ,
Z21 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗124, e∗234, zˆ} ,
Z22 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗134, e∗234, zˆ} ,
Z23 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗123, e∗124, e∗134} ,
Z24 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗123, e∗124, e∗234} ,
Z25 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗123, e∗134, e∗234} ,
Z26 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗124, e∗134, e∗234} ,
Z27 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗123, e∗124, e∗134, zˆ} ,
Z28 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗123, e∗124, e∗234, zˆ} ,
Z29 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗123, e∗134, e∗234, zˆ} ,
Z30 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , e∗124, e∗134, e∗234, zˆ} ,
Z31 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , {e∗ijk}ijk∈S3} ,
Z32 =
{{ei}i∈S1 , {e∗ij}ij∈S2 , {e∗ijk}ijk∈S3 , zˆ} .45
Then, if the following subsets are non-empty then:
• if ϕ ∈ Φ24 ∩ (∪3s3=1Φ3s3) then Z∗ = Z1;
• if ϕ ∈ Φ24 ∩ (Φ30 ∪ Φ34) then Z∗ = Z2;
• if ϕ ∈ Φ23 ∩ (∪3s3=1Φ3s3) then Z∗ ∈ {Z3, . . .Z6};
• if ϕ ∈ Φ23 ∩ (Φ30 ∪ Φ34) then Z∗ ∈ {Z7, . . .Z10};
• if ϕ ∈ Φ22 ∩ (∪3s3=1Φ3s3) then Z∗ ∈ {Z11, . . .Z16};
• if ϕ ∈ Φ22 ∩ (Φ30 ∪ Φ34) then Z∗ ∈ {Z17, . . .Z22};
• if ϕ ∈ Φ21 ∩ (∪3s3=1Φ3s3) then Z∗ ∈ {Z23, . . .Z26};
• if ϕ ∈ Φ21 ∩ (Φ30 ∪ Φ34) then Z∗ ∈ {Z27, . . .Z30};
• ϕ ∈ Φ20 ∩ (∪3s3=1Φ3s3) then Z∗ = Z31;
• if ϕ ∈ Φ20 ∩ (Φ30 ∪ Φ34) then Z∗ = Z32.
Next, we evaluate the verification of Nash conditions: First, the stationary states in the
vertices are all Nash equilibria, because u(e1)−u(e1) = (0,−ϕ1m12,−ϕ1m13,−ϕ1m14), u(e2)−
u(e2) = (−ϕ2m12, 0,−ϕ2m23,−ϕ2m24), u(e3) − u(e3) = (−ϕ3m13,−ϕ3m23, 0,−ϕ3m34), and
u(e4) − u(e4) = (−ϕ4m14,−ϕ4m24,−ϕ4m34, 0). Also, if there is an interior steady state zˆ it is
also a Nash equilibrium because u(zˆ) = u(zˆ).
Second, the stationary states in the edges eij verify:
u(e∗12)− u(e∗12) =
(
0, 0,
ϕ1ϕ2m12(3)
ϕ1 + ϕ2
,
ϕ1ϕ2m12(4)
ϕ1 + ϕ2
)
≤ 0
u(e∗13)− u(e∗13) =
(
0,
ϕ1ϕ3m13(2)
ϕ1 + ϕ3
, 0,
ϕ1ϕ3m13(4)
ϕ1 + ϕ3
)
u(e∗14)− u(e∗14) =
(
0,
ϕ1ϕ4m14(2)
ϕ1 + ϕ4
,
ϕ1ϕ4m14(3)
ϕ1 + ϕ4
, 0
)
u(e∗23)− u(e∗23) =
(
ϕ2ϕ3m23(1)
ϕ2 + ϕ3
, 0, 0,
ϕ2ϕ3m23(4)
ϕ2 + ϕ3
)
≤ 0
u(e∗24)− u(e∗24) =
(
ϕ2ϕ4m24(1)
ϕ2 + ϕ4
, 0,
ϕ2ϕ4m24(3)
ϕ2 + ϕ4
, 0
)
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u(e∗34)− u(e∗34) =
(
ϕ3ϕ4m34(1)
ϕ3 + ϕ4
,
ϕ3ϕ4m34(2)
ϕ3 + ϕ4
, 0, 0
)
≤ 0
As k12 = k34 = 0 then, e
∗
12 and e
∗
34 are always Nash equilibria , and the other equilibria may
not be Nash, because k13 = k34 = k34 = 1 and k14 = 2. However there is a close relationship
between the Nash property for the other equilibria e∗ij and the existence of equilibria in edges
eijk: if z11 = e
∗
123 then e
∗
13 is a Nash equilibrium, if z12 = e
∗
124 and z13 = e
∗
134 then e
∗
14 is a Nash
equilibrium and if z14 = e
∗
234 then e
∗
34 is a Nash equilibrium. This means that unless all the
the expressions mij(k) are non-positive, there will always be at least one equilibrium of type e
∗
ij
which is not a Nash equilibrium.
For the equilibria e∗ijk, because we need to impose conditions on the parameters that ensure
that they belong to the simplex, we readily see that they are all Nash equilibria:
u(e∗123)− u(e∗123) =
(
0, 0, 0,−ϕ1ϕ2ϕ3m123
d123
)
≤ 0
u(e∗124)− u(e∗124) =
(
0, 0,−ϕ1ϕ2ϕ4m124
d124
, 0
)
≤ 0
u(e∗134)− u(e∗134) =
(
0,−ϕ1ϕ3ϕ4m134
d134
, 0, 0
)
≤ 0
u(e∗234)− u(e∗234) =
(
−ϕ2ϕ3ϕ4m234
d234
, 0, 0, 0
)
≤ 0
C.8 Proof of Proposition 9.
Proof. We evaluate the spectra for the Jacobian F
′
(z∗) at the stationary strategy profiles, such
that z∗ ∈ ∆3. For the equilibria in the vertices, we have
σ(e1) =
{
− ϕ1
4
,−ϕ1m12,−ϕ1m13,−ϕ1m14
}
σ(e2) =
{
− ϕ2
4
,−ϕ2m12,−ϕ2m23,−ϕ2m24
}
σ(e3) =
{
− ϕ3
4
,−ϕ3m13,−ϕ3m23,−ϕ3m24
}
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σ(e4) =
{
− ϕ4
4
,−ϕ4m14,−ϕ4m24,−ϕ4m34
}
.
They are all negative, therefore ei are sinks, and the local stable manifold is four-dimensional.
For the equilibria in the edges e∗ij we have
σ(e∗12) =
{
ϕ1ϕ2
ϕ1 + ϕ2
m12,
ϕ1γ2
ϕ1 + ϕ2
(
m12 − 1
2
)
,
ϕ1ϕ2
ϕ1 + ϕ2
m12(3),
ϕ1ϕ2
ϕ1 + ϕ2
m12(4)
}
σ(e∗13) =
{
ϕ1ϕ3
ϕ1 + ϕ3
m13,
ϕ1ϕ3
ϕ1 + ϕ3
(
m13 − 1
2
)
,
ϕ1ϕ3
ϕ1 + ϕ3
m13(2),
ϕ1ϕ3
ϕ1 + ϕ3
m13(4)
}
σ(e∗14) =
{
ϕ1ϕ4
ϕ1 + ϕ4
m14,
ϕ1ϕ4
ϕ1 + ϕ4
(
m14 − 1
2
)
,
ϕ1ϕ4
ϕ1 + ϕ4
m14(2),
ϕ1ϕ4
ϕ1 + ϕ4
m14(3)
}
σ(e∗23) =
{
ϕ2ϕ3
ϕ2 + ϕ3
m23,
ϕ2ϕ3
ϕ2 + ϕ3
(
m23 − 1
2
)
,
ϕ2ϕ3
ϕ2 + ϕ3
m23(1),
ϕ2ϕ3
ϕ2 + ϕ3
m23(4)
}
σ(e∗24) =
{
ϕ2ϕ4
ϕ2 + ϕ4
m24,
ϕ2ϕ4
ϕ2 + ϕ4
(
m24 − 1
2
)
,
ϕ2ϕ4
ϕ2 + ϕ4
m24(1),
ϕ2ϕ4
ϕ2 + ϕ4
m24(3)
}
σ(e∗34) =
{
ϕ3ϕ4
ϕ3 + ϕ4
m34,
ϕ3ϕ4
ϕ3 + ϕ4
(
m34 − 1
2
)
,
ϕ3ϕ4
ϕ3 + ϕ4
m34(1),
ϕ3ϕ4
ϕ3 + ϕ4
m34(2)
}
.
Then they are all generalized saddles. However the local stable manifolds dimensions may differ:
e∗12, e
∗
23 and e
∗
34 are three-dimensional, e
∗
13 and e
∗
24 may be three-dimensional or two dimensional
(if m13(2) > 0, in the first case, or m24(3) > 0) and e
∗
14 may be three-, two, o one dimensional. If
φ ∈ Φ24 the least-dimensional case and if φ ∈ Φ20 the higher-dimensional case holds.
For the equilibria e∗ijk the spectra are:
σ(e123) =
{
−ϕ1ϕ2ϕ3
d123
(
m12m12(3) +m13m13(2) +m23m23(1) + 2m12m13m23
)
,−ϕ1ϕ2ϕ3m123
d123
,
−ϕ1ϕ2ϕ3m12m13m23
d123
(
1 + (∆123)
1/2
)
,−ϕ1ϕ2ϕ3m12m13m23
d123
(
1− (∆123)1/2
)}
where
∆123 ≡ 1 + m12(3)m13(2)m23(1)
m12m13m23
,
as m13(2 ≤ 0 and d123 < 0, e∗123 it is a generalized saddle with a one-dimensional, if m123 > 0 or
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two dimensional saddle manifold, if m123 < 0;
σ(e124) =
{
−ϕ1ϕ2ϕ4
d124
(
m12m12(4) +m14m14(2) +m24m24(1) + 2m12m14m24
)
,−ϕ1ϕ2ϕ4m124
d124
,
−ϕ1ϕ2ϕ4m12m14m24
d124
(
1 + (∆124)
1/2
)
,−ϕ1ϕ2ϕ4m12m14m24
d124
(
1− (∆124)1/2
)}
where
∆124 ≡ 1 + m12(4)m14(2)m24(1)
m12m14m24
as m14(2 ≤ 0 and d124 < 0, e∗124 it is a generalized saddle with a one-dimensional, if m124 > 0 or
two dimensional saddle manifold, if m124 < 0;
σ(e134) =
{
−ϕ1ϕ3ϕ4
d134
(
m13m13(4) +m14m14(3) +m34m34(1) + 2m13m14m34
)
,−ϕ1ϕ3ϕ4m134
d134
,
−ϕ1ϕ3ϕ4m13m14m34
d134
(
1 + (∆134)
1/2
)
,−ϕ1ϕ3ϕ4m13m14m34
d134
(
1− (∆134)1/2
)
,
}
where
∆134 ≡ 1 + m13(4)m14(3)m34(1)
m13m14m34
as m14(3 ≤ 0 and d134 < 0, e∗134 it is a generalized saddle with a one-dimensional, if m134 > 0 or
two dimensional saddle manifold, if m134 < 0;
σ(e234) =
{
−ϕ2ϕ3ϕ4
d234
(
m23m23(4) +m24m24(3) +m34m34(2) + 2m23m24m34
)
,−ϕ2ϕ3ϕ4m234
d234
,
−ϕ2ϕ3ϕ4m23m24m34
d234
(
1 + (∆234)
1/2
)
,−ϕ2ϕ3ϕ4m23m24m34
d234
(
1− (∆234)1/2
)
,
}
where
∆234 ≡ 1 + m23(4)m24(3)m34(2)
m23m24m34
as m24(3 ≤ 0 and d234 < 0, e∗234 it is a generalized saddle with a one-dimensional, if m234 > 0 or
two dimensional saddle manifold, if m234 < 0.
The expressions for the eigenvalues at the interior equilibria are too large to report., however
if it exists the local stable manifold at zˆ should be one-dimensional.
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PC=1
PC=1/3
PC=1/2
.
Figure 1: Consistency
Figure 2: Bifurcation diagram in the space (ϕ1, ϕ3), for equally spaced conjectures ϕ2 = (ϕ1 +
ϕ3)/2.
50
Φ1
Φ2 Φ3
Φ1
Φ2 Φ3
Figure 3: Phase diagrams over the simplex for equally spaced conjectures: the top panel is for
case Γ > 0 where (ϕ1, ϕ3) = (1, 2) and the bottom panel for Γ < 0 where (ϕ1, ϕ3) = (0.01, 1.9).
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Figure 4: Bifurcation diagram in the space (φ2, φ3)for φ1 = −0.99 and φ4 = 0.9. The top left
graph refers to set Φ2s2 and the top right graph refers to Φ
3. In the bottom graph the areas
correspond to eleven multiple steady states distributions: Z4, Z1 , Z11 (in this case e∗13 is Nash),
Z14 (e∗14 is Nash), Z20 (e∗14 is Nash), Z23 (e∗13 and e∗14 are Nash), Z26 (e∗23 and e∗14 are Nash), Z27
(e∗13 and e
∗
14 are Nash), Z30 (e∗23 and e∗14 are Nash), Z32 (all Nash).
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